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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article constitutes an effort to describe the influence of social
networks on how individuals choose to process their legal disputes. The
objective is to explain how social connections shape the ways in which conflict
is processed within formal institutions. Using the social context in which the
Venezuelan business sector operates as a framework, this research tries to
draw a real life picture of how dispute processing occurs in society, which in
turn, is important in understanding how different systems of social control can
function.
For many years, scholars from several social science disciplines have
explored the ways in which the processing of legal disputes occurs in society.
Anthropologists, for example, have offered a deep and highly contextualized
description of the social and cultural dynamics that take place in different
primitive or rural environments in order to explain how the larger social
structure is affected. Social psychologists, have instead devoted their attention
to the narrow sphere of individual behavior, focusing on the reaction of
individuals to social processes, but often from a de-contextualized perspective.
In contrast, legal scholars have turned most of their interest to formal and
official institutions, with special emphasis on the importance of statesponsored enforcement mechanisms. Even though mainstream legal scholars
have also expressed an interest in exploring the role of legal actors, their
approach is usually limited to a legal centralistic one.
Legal scholars have viewed official legal institutions and their normative
framework as society's most important component, responsible for the
achievement of social order, progress, and economic efficiency. During the
last two decades, multilateral institutions have embarked on an enormous
enterprise to propagate this fairytale idea, but have largely ignored the context
and the cultural nuances that distinguish the different countries for which these
formulas are geared.
An example of this has occurred with the implementation of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms in Latin America. The vast majority
of the judicial reform initiatives proposed by the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank in Latin America included the promotion of
ADR as a way to attract foreign private investors to the region and as a remedy
for the perceived congestion and malfunctioning of the courts. ADR processes
were believed to work well in developed countries (namely, the United States)
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for handling disputes at many different levels; therefore, reform advocates
viewed these processes as a panacea for the region.
Latin American governments felt compelled to implement policies
regarding ADR. At the same time, a number of private corporations and
chambers of commerce began funding initiatives to create ADR centers to
serve mainly the business community. It was believed that by helping this
sector, governments were creating favorable conditions to attract foreign
investment, which considered the existence of modern and transparent dispute
processing institutions a priority.
Despite the large investment in ADR institutions and the numerous
campaigns geared to highlight the benefits of the modem, cost-efficient, and
transparent mechanisms now available to business disputants, members of the
business community did not embrace these new mechanisms. Business parties
continued processing most of their disputes in the same ways they did before
the judicial reform craze. Instead of the new institutionalized ADR, informal
conciliatory processes channeled through the existing social networks were
widely utilized. Some close-knit communities (e.g., the diamond industry)
continued employing the same traditional ways of dealing with disputes among
its members, employing the help of their dense social networks; even the
official courts were often utilized by business disputants with their social
connections in mind.
As is known from previous research,' disputants in general contemplate a
wide array of procedural choices. Official institutions are just one of their
alternatives, but little has been done in order to present a comparative view2
about the different avenues that are available to disputants in light of their
social and cultural context. Such an analysis would definitely improve the
understanding about how the dispute processing business of a given
society--or particular sector within a society-is distributed.'

See, e.g., Richard Abel, A Comparative Theory ofDispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 217, 230 (1973); William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organizationon
DisputeProcessing,9 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 63, 64 (1974); Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute
Processing:Litigation in a Small Claims Court, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 339, 342 (1976).
' Sarat, supranote 1, at 342 ("[M]ost studies of litigation are not comparative, that is, they
do not place litigation in the context of the full range of dispute processing alternatives which
society provides. Few have inquired as to why disputants choose one alternative over others
which might deal with their problem ...").
' Id. at 341 ("Thus the choices which people make among dispute processing alternatives
are important in determining the way in which society's dispute processing business is
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Why Explore the Business Sector
To obtain a more complete picture of dispute processing activities in
society, one cannot only study the courts, but must also expand his research to
other levels of social organization and to the processes that take place on these
other levels. Therefore, the study of procedural choices in the larger context
is very important. In order to do such a study, one would have to take into
account all the available choices (or, at least, the greatest possible array of
choices) in a particular society. Such an effort would obviously require an
enormous data collection task beyond the capabilities of an individual
researcher.
A more limited, but by no means less important, feasible approach is to
limit the scope of the research to a particular sector of a given society, explore
the available options that are presented to individuals in that specific context
and try to identify the factors that shape their procedural preferences. This
way, a researcher could obtain a picture that is closer to reality, and would be
able to explore what works, what does not, and why. The business sector is
suitable for this approach for a number of reasons.
First, the business sector is usually an affluent segment of society whose
members tend to have more access to resources and to innovation than other
groups. As a result, business people encounter fewer barriers when accessing
formal and informal dispute processing fora and mechanisms than do members
of other segments of society. However, in their everyday life, business people
have to circumvent many obstacles, and their exposure to dispute processing
choices is generally broader than other groups' exposure.
Second, as a result of their interaction with other actors-both within and
outside their environment-business people are in a constant process of
learning new techniques to conduct their activities, adapting to other settings,
and adopting different ways of dealing with difficulties that arise in the course
of their business dealings.
Finally, the business sector has been the focus of several legal and judicial
reform efforts (e.g., World Bank reform agendas) due to the belief that
strengthening and devoting important resources to business will lead to greater
economic welfare and to overall improved socioeconomic conditions. As a
result, the business sector has been the test ground for new dispute processing

distributed.").
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techniques (namely, ADR). This is yet another reason to focus on this sector
when exploring disputants' behavioral and procedural choices.
This Article, therefore, focuses on business disputes. I define business
disputes broadly to mean potential legal conflicts in which a business has a
stake or interest. Given this broad definition, business disputes are not
necessarily of a commercial nature. For example, they can also relate to labor
and intellectual property. I am not considering, however, disputes that involve
public entities or the state even if the other party is a private business entity or
individual business people. Each of these categories may have different
features, and they are often processed in very different ways.
This Article addresses two interconnected research questions: which
dispute processing systems are preferred, and why. I try to answer these
questions through the subjective lens of Venezuelan business disputants.4 I do
not aspire to draw generalizations or to derive some theory from my
observations; my goal is simply to offer a description of how the social and
cultural dynamics shape the ways in which individuals behave.
Although I have chosen to explore the business sector of Venezuela, my
intention has not been to do a study only about how social networks influence
the ways in which business disputes are dealt with in Venezuela. Rather, it is
research about how the social, cultural, economic, and political dimensions of
a given society (indeed, it could be any society) interplay with the existing
social networks in affecting individuals' procedural choices. But, in order to
correlate theory with reality, Venezuela is employed as a case study.
I believe that this approach represents a helpful way of understanding,
generally, how dispute processing mechanisms are used in light of the existing
institutions and other fora.
Studying the Venezuelan business context offers a tremendous opportunity
to discover dispute processing choices in an environment that combines many
features that are typically seen in technologically advanced, modem, and
affluent societies and at the same time, discover some of the characteristics
that socio-legal scholars attribute to societies considered to be primitive,
indigenous, or traditional. This interesting contrast allows me to explore how

' See Robert M. Hayden & Jill K. Anderson, On the Evaluation ofProceduralSystems in
LaboratoryExperiments: A Critique of Thibaut and Walker, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 21, 36
(1979).
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the different mechanisms of social control interact within a specific social and
cultural context, and how the social network paradigm can facilitate its study.
This Article is divided into seven parts. Parts I and II offer an introduction
to and a description of the methodological approach that constitutes the basis
Part mI addresses the conceptual and theoretical
of this research.
underpinnings of this Article. To this end, I offer a description of the
traditional dichotomy that prevails in the socio-legal literature when describing
different social structures and legal systems. In this part, I also contrast the
different approaches used to explain dispute processing and offer the social
networks paradigm as an analytical tool for explaining choices for dispute
processing fora and mechanisms. Part IV describes the structure of
Venezuelan society and its business sector, with special attention to the
pervasiveness of social networks at several levels. Part V explains how social
networks are relied upon by users of the official legal system, and how
disputants have strong incentives to use the courts, in spite of the conventional
wisdom that the judiciary is the least preferred forum because of its perceived
malfunctioning. Part VI, further applies the social networks' paradigm to
explain why business disputants in Venezuela have not embraced the recently
promoted ADR centers and how they prefer to use mediation and arbitration
outside these institutions. Finally, Part VII offers the conclusion.
II. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The overarching strategy of the research that constitutes the basis of this
Article has been a case study using different methods to collect, classify, and
analyze the data that informs its substance.
In order to gain a broad but meaningful view of how social networks
influence dispute processing choices for institutionalized mechanisms and fora
by members of the Venezuelan business sector, I collected data on the two
main areas of institutionalized business disputes--courts and ADR
centers-that are available to parties in that country.'

5 The larger project, in which this Article is based, also focused on "non-institutionalized"
processes, that is, those that take place outside state-sponsored institutions. I specifically
addressed two forms of informal dispute processing that are available to business disputants in
Venezuela: the use of shaming techniques by debt-collection agencies to enforce contracts, and
the use of arbitration among non-Jewish diamond merchants to process the disputes arising from
their dealings. The idea was to illustrate how social networks are equally relevant in the
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The majority of the data collected for this research were obtained from
secondary sources in the form of administrative records and documents
(judicial statistics on court usage, examination of official records and private
databases alike) and from semi-structured interviews with at least seventy
respondents who were selected because of their familiarity with the particular
aspects of each case.
Several court officials, public and private administrators (such as judicial
reform program managers and ADR program managers respectively), lawyers,
and their clients (individual businesspeople and executives representing
business entities of various sizes and natures) were the core of my research
population. As for the business people and executives, most of them were
domestic, as the majority of their business activity took place in Venezuela, but
I also looked into foreign investors and to Venezuelans who conduct their
activities in other jurisdictions.
Interviewees were selected-as it commonly happens when doing
qualitative research-through a non-random purposive sampling technique;
that is a deliberately chosen group of persons, settings, or events that possess
certain characteristics or information that cannot be obtained from other
choices. 6
As I gained access to the databases of several business organizations and
chambers of commerce, it was possible to get a comprehensive map of how the
business community is organized in Venezuela, and most importantly, about
the different relations that exist among its members. The lawyers who serve
these people and organizations were also taken into account because they are
usually the ones who make, or heavily influence, the decisions to use a
particular forum or dispute processing method.
Most interviews were based on protocols prepared in advance. Even
though my informants agreed without hesitation to participate in the study, I
promised most of them that I would keep their identities confidential; this
helped promote candor during our conversations. The majority of the
interviews were conducted during my trips to Venezuela, face-to-face, with the

selection of mechanisms and fora for processing business disputes at the formal and informal
levels. For a detailed discussion see Manuel A. G6mez, All in the Family (Jan. 2007)
(unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Stanford University, available at http://www.law.stanford.
edu/publications/dissertationstheses/dissMAGomez-dft07.pdf).
6 Joseph A. Maxwell, Designing a QualitativeStudy, in HANDBOOK OF APPLIED SOCIAL
RESEARCH METHODS 87 (Leonard Bickman & Debra J. Reg eds., 1998).
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interviewees, and only a relatively small number of interviews had to be
conducted by phone or electronic mail in cases where some interviewees were
in a different city or country.
Some of my interviewees agreed to meet me on more than one occasion,
either for follow-up conversations or to talk about new issues that emerged
after our initial encounters. The average interview lasted ninety minutes, and
sometimes digital recordings were possible, but in general, I did not transcribe
the conversations; rather, I used the recorded files to complete my notes or to
confirm notions that were not clear when the conversation took place. When
I was not able to record the interview, personal notes were taken; those notes
were then organized and coded for further use during the writing process.
The field research was conducted during at least eight trips to Venezuela
in the four years between the spring of 2002 and the summer of 2006. Because
some trips were two or three months long, I was often able to organize data
collection efforts with relatively little time pressure.
The methodological approach that I have selected for this project has some
distinctive advantages. First, it has allowed me to obtain a deep and
contextualized description of the social, cultural, and institutional
environments in which business disputants interact. Second, it has made
possible the gathering of data through different empirical methods. Finally, it
has given me an opportunity to explore a social phenomenon in its real-life
form and to analyze it from a sociological perspective in a way that has been
generally overlooked by socio-legal scholars.
As for the limitations, perhaps the most important one, as in any case study,
lies in the fact that this research is not representative, in the sense that one
cannot infer frequencies or generalizations from it. Notwithstanding the
limitations, the kind of qualitative research that I have selected seems to be the
most appropriate given the type of research questions posed and the objectives
that inform this research.
Il.

THE COMPETING PARADIGMS IN THE STUDY OF DISPUTE
PROCESSING AND PROCEDURAL CHOICES

A. Modern Societies, Primitive Societies: A Real Dichotomy?
The efforts ofsocio-legal scholars in understanding how dispute processing
systems work and how the social, cultural, economic, and political dimensions
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interact with each other have always focused on two polar opposite types of
society, two contrasting realities that are perceived to embody different styles
of procedures.7 On the one hand, there are the underdeveloped and traditional
societies. In these, official courts and other basic institutions may exist,8 but
the social, economic and political structure is largely dominated by (extended)
families, cliques, groups, or clans that give way to the rise of strong social
networks, which in turn influence how society operates, reinforce its cultural
values, and most importantly, provide the conditions under which social
conflict is handled. 9
The normative system of these less-modem societies is basically defined
by indigenous or local norms and the dispute processing institutions here tend
to be undifferentiated." Also, legal norms are often intertwined with social
norms; thus, frequently, the two are difficult to differentiate from one
another."
Compliance and enforcement are usually achieved through several forms
of coercion such as shaming, gossiping, or threat of social isolation; and here,
the political authorities tend to be the same as social ones (elders, wise men,
chiefs). 2 Ordinary members of these societies usually know and understand
the normative system well enough, so that legal disputes can be usually
handled face-to-face, with the direct involvement of the parties, and by taking
into consideration their broader and often multiplex social relationships.13 As
for dispute processing preferences, socio-legal scholars generally believed that
individuals from less developed, collectivistic, or preliterate societies tend to
prefer non-confrontational methods that reinforce social harmony, like
mediation. '4
At the other extreme, there are the modem, affluent, and industriallyadvanced societies (or in Felstiner's terminology a Technologically Complex

Felstiner, supra note 1, at 65.

8 Id. at 72.

9 Id. at 67.
Abel, supra note 1, at 296.

10

MICHAEL BARKuN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER INPRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE
WORLD COMMUNITY (1968).
12 ROBERT H. LOWlE, PRivIrrivE SOCIETY 395 (1947).
'3 Felstiner, supranote 1, at 78-79; Abel, supra note 1, at 230.
'4 Kwok Leung et al., Preferencefor Methods of Conflict Processingin Two Collectivist
Cultures, 27 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 195, 206-07 (1992).
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Rich Society--or TCRS"5 ) that typically feature well-defined private and
public official institutions, as well as specialized, complex, and highly
technical dispute management processes.6 The formal normative system in
these societies is viewed as part of a modem and sophisticated structure, which
also makes it expensive to operate. 7 It is, in other words, more "legal."' 8 In
order to use this complicated apparatus, ordinary citizens have to abide by
formalistic standards and to rely on lawyers or other professionals who act as
brokers, go-betweens, or intermediaries. 9 The scholarly work dealing with
these systems is generally limited to the description of official institutions and
the typical adjudicative procedures that take place within them.2"
In recent years, scholars have increasingly focused on informal dispute
processing methods within modem societies, 2 thus slightly moving away from
the traditional approach of legal centralism.22 However, these situations are
described as if they only pertain to small, closed communities and are
generally portrayed as an exception or rare event within a society that has
learned to use arguably better and more modem and sophisticated forms of
handling disputes through its official institutions. In this sense, examples of
informality within modern and complex societies are seen as mere "pockets"
of indigenousness and not as alternatives that modem citizens consciously
choose.23
However, not every society can be easily identified as either purely modem
and industrialized or entirely traditional. Though these categories are helpful
constructs, reality does not necessarily (and almost never does) fit into these

"5Felstiner, supra note 1, at 65.
16 Id.
"7Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in
Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 267, 269 (1976).
" Id.at 270.
19 Id. at 269.
20 Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, PrivateOrdering,and Indigenous
Law,
19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 20-21 (1981).
21 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business:A PreliminaryStudy,
28 Am.Soc. REV. 55, 56 (1963); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?. (1983);
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOWNEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES (1991); John

McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 637 (1999).
22 See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 869, 874 (1988).
23 Richard Danzing & Michael J. Lowy, Everyday Disputes and Mediation in the United
States: A Reply to ProfessorFelstiner,9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 675, 677 (1975).
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extremes. Along the spectrum, there are, for example, societies that have welldefined public institutions and market-oriented economies, that could be easily
labeled as technologically advanced. But at the same time, their social
structure resembles that ofthe stereotypical traditional community, in the sense
that extended families and close-knit groups are prevalent and exert important
influence upon most aspects of social life.24
As my research shows, even in the societies that contain many features of
modernism, indigenous aspects often play an important role. An understanding
of how social institutions perform is best gained by looking beyond the
"apparent" modern/traditional dichotomy that has prevailed in scholarly
discourse.
B. TheoreticalParadigmsandDisputeProcessing
For many years, the exploration of the ways in which the processing of
legal disputes occurs in society has occupied the attention of scholars from
several social-science disciplines.2 5
Legal and social anthropologists, for instance, have focused on describing
the social conditions that motivate the emergence of disputes as cultural
processes, and the ways in which individuals-as social and cultural
beings-choose among several available dispute processing institutions in noninstitutionalized environments. 26 The majority of this research involved
ethnographic studies of small communities, villages, or tribes outside the
U.S., 27 which are usually portrayed as traditional, poor, and very different from

24 See, e.g., Ana Julia Jatar, Competition Policy in Venezuela: The Promotion of Social

Change,in COMPETITION POLICY, DEREGULATION, AND MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 95,
111 (Moisds Naim & Joseph L. Tulchin eds., 1999). See also LAS EMPRESAS VENEZOLANAS:
Su GERENCIA 10 (Moisds Naim ed., 1989).
25 See Laura Nader, The AnthropologicalStudy ofLaw, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 3 (1965).
26 However, as Nader has explained, the interests of the early ethnographers of law "were
strongly set in an empirical mode based on the publications of Malinowski, Llewellyn and
Hoebel, Gluckman, Bohannan, Pospisil, Moore, Schapera, and Gulliver." See LAURA NADER,
HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE, at xvi (1991)

(citation omitted).
27 See

P.H. GULuVER, SOCiALCONTROLINANAFRICAN SOCIETY 173-302 (1963) (describing

dispute procedures among the Arusha of Northern Tanganyika, currently Tanzania); Bernard S.
Cohn, AnthropologicalNotes on Disputes andLaw in India,67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 82-122
(1965) (reviewing results of research by anthropologists on questions of disputes and law in
India); MAX GLUCKMAN, CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1955); J. Van Nelsen, Procedural
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the modem and affluent western societies. Through these studies, scholars
focused on describing the social conditions under which several forms of
dispute processing were likely to occur, 28 and gave special attention to the
social organization, the normative system, the available dispute processing
institutions, as well as the different enforcement mechanisms present in each
of these environments.29
Regardless of their differences, these societies, generally, were
characterized by having a similar social structure often dominated by families,
clans and other close-knit groups whose members were interconnected through
multiplex, long-standing social relationships.3" Even though in the villages'
countries formal public institutions were present, the social organization of the
social environments subject to study still depended on the operation of
informal networks, and political authority was entangled with social
leadership. 3 The normative system of these traditional societies was largely
defined by indigenous norms that often resulted from long traditions and
customary practices as opposed to the highly technical and formal legal
framework of modem societies. 32
Dispute processing institutions that operate in these social contexts were
often cataloged as resulting from factors such as: the influence of strong social
networks, an expanded family structure, and the absence ofa well-defined state
apparatus. 3 In addition, the fact that most members of these societies had
strong social ties among themselves led researchers to believe that these
environments favored a preference for conciliatory processes over adjudicatory
ones.34 As for the enforcement of rights in these small societies, disputants not

Informality, Reconciliation, and False Comparison, in IDEAS AND PROCEDURES IN AFRICAN
CUSTOMARY LAW 137-52 (Max Gluckman ed., 1969); Y.P. Ghai, Customary Contractsand
Transactionsin Kenya, in IDEAS AND PROCEDURES IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 332-46 (Max
Gluckman ed., 1969); THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Harry
F. Todd, Jr. eds., 1978).
28 Felstiner, supra note 1, at 62, 63.
29 Sally Engle Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2060 (1987)
(reviewing STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)).
30 See supra note 27.
31 Id.

32See Galanter, supra note 20, at 20.
31 See Austin Sarat & Joel B. Grossman, Courtsand Conflict Resolution: Problems in the
Mobilization ofAdjudication, 69 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 1200, 1203 (1975).
" See Dan Henderson, Law and Political Modernization in Japan, in POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN 449 (Robert Ward ed., 1968); Kwok Leung, Some
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only rely on the existence of a superior authority, but on a different system in
which the notions of reputation and face have great value. 35 "Informal"
processes, though often highly ritualistic and formalistic, were widely used in
these settings.36
By offering a thick description of real-life situations, the work of legal
anthropologists shed light on how the legal system works. In addition, these
studies not only brought awareness to American scholars about other societies
but also helped scholars understand how social control operated within these
various contexts 37 and in particular, the ways in which legal disputes were
processed under different conditions. This line of research, however, also
reinforced the notion of the apparent dichotomial view prevailing among sociolegal scholars that labeled societies as either simple, poor and primitive, or
complex, rich, and modem.3"
Social psychologists, on the other hand, have not paid much attention to the
externalforces, but rather, to individual behavior.39 Their focus has been to
explore the ways in which people, as rational beings, conduct themselves and
how they react to social processes (the processing of disputes being one of
them) that affect their individual sphere.4 ° Thibaut and Walker are usually
regarded among the precursors of the field of "procedural justice,"'" and are

Determinants of Reactions to ProceduralModels for Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National
Study, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 898 (1987) (mentioning the work of Henderson,
Kawashima, Peterson, Shimada and Doo among others, who have concluded that members of
Asian societies prefer non-adjudicatory processes).
" Sarat & Grossman, supra note 33.
36 Id.

17 See LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, at viii (Laura Nader ed., 1969). This was, according
to Nader, the focus of the Burg Warternstein conference held in Austria in 1966. Id.
38 Felstiner, supra note 1, at 63.
39 See, e.g., John Thibaut et al., AdversaryPresentationand Bias in Legal Decisionmaking,
86 HARV. L. REv. 386 (1972); Robin I. Lissak & Blair H. Sheppard, Beyond Fairness: The
CriterionProblemin Research on DisputeIntervention, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 45 (1983);
Larry B. Heuer & Steven Penrod, ProceduralPreferenceas a Functionof Conflict Intensity, 51
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700 (1986); Blair H. Sheppard et al.,
ProceduralJusticefrom

the Third Party Perspective, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (1988).
40 Thibaut et al., supra note 39; Lissak & Sheppard, supra note 39; Heuer & Penrod, supra

note 39; Sheppard et al., supra note 39.
41 Donna Shestowsky, ProceduralPreferencesin AlternativeDisputeResolution: A Closer,
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB.POL'Y & L. 211, 216 (2004); Deborah R.
Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J.DISP. RES. 81, 85
(2002); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 7
(1988); Kwok Leung & E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice and Culture: Effects of Culture,
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also credited with establishing the use of psychological laboratory
experimentation for conducting legal research.42 This approach, Thibaut and
Walker believed, could help scholars gain insight into the behavior of legal
actors,43 and also "facilitate comparison of whole systems of conflict resolution
as well as the assessment of proposed changes within individual systems."'
Social psychologists acknowledged that procedural principles are important
to the study of both informal and formal processes,45 but most of their research
focused on assessing institutionalized methods for dispute processing. 46 After
all, the prevailing interest among those interested in dispute resolution has
been dominated by research focusing on legalistic, state-centered, and formal
processes that take place within official institutions.47
Legal scholars have, instead, turned most of their attention to the study of
formal institutions, to the official system of social control, and to the ways in
which its enforcement mechanisms work.48 They have also focused on legal
actors and the processes in which they participate, but this focus is frequently
made from a legal centralistic viewpoint that considers government as the main
source of rules and social order.49
The way in which people process their disputes matters to legal scholars,
but this is generally viewed as only a component of a large, technical, and
complicated structure.5" The interest of traditional legal scholars is not so
much in explaining how individuals choose to actually process their disputes,
but rather, how they shouldprocess them in light of the normative order that
is in place.
In this sense, dispute processing mechanisms are examined in terms of
formal steps and pre-existing sets of rules, while individual behavior is

Gender, and Investigator Status on Procedural Preferences, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1134 (1986).
42

Hensler, supra note 41, at 85.

4' Thibaut et al., supra note 39, at 387.
44 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

1(1975).
4' Thibaut et al., supra note 39.
46 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 44.
47 Galanter, supra note 20, at 20-21. But see Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and
Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of PrivateOrdering,104 COLUM. L. REV.
2328,2330 (2004).
48 Galanter, supra note 20, at 20-21.
49 Id.
50 Friedman

& Percival, supranote 17, at 269.
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observed in terms of how it conforms (or not) with what the law says."' It is
true, though, that for several years now, a number of legal scholars have
expanded their interest to understand dispute processing that occurs outside
formal institutions. 2 However, the traditional legal centralistic approach has
been so powerful and overwhelming that any attempt to offer an alternative
approach looks almost insignificant.
Formal law and legal institutions have been portrayed by legal scholars as
the backbone of society, as an essential component that not only guarantees
social order but also progress and economic efficiency.53 As a result, since the
mid-1 980s, the World Bank and other multilateral institutions have led the way
in advancing ambitious reform agendas that are focused on the modernization
of public institutions and the promotion of the rule of law. 4
In fact, most judicial reform agendas (as proposed by multilateral
organizations) prescribe that in order to achieve progress, developing countries
need to replicate legal institutions and processes that are used in developed and
more advanced societies. 5 As a result, institutions and dispute processing
models have been transplanted from one place to another not only as
development tools but with a wide, and sometimes contradicting, range of
objectives in mind. 6
The actual benefits of these initiatives have been much less than its
proponents expected. This is in great part because their implementation has

"' John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?,24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 3 (1986).
52 See David Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders,and PersonalInjuries in an

American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 551 (1984); see also ELLCKSON, supra note 21,
at 40; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: ExtralegalContractualRelations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Richman, supra note 47.
" See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S
ORDER: AN ECONOMIC ACCOUNT (2000).
14

See JUDICIALREFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROCEEDINGS OFAWORLD

BANK CONFERENCE (Malcolm Rowat et al. eds., 1995); Richard E. Messick, JudicialReformand
Economic Development: A Survey ofthe Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999).
" IBRAHIM F. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 169 (1995); IBRAHIM F.
SHIHATA, COMPLEMENTARY REFORM: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, JUDICIAL AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL

REFORMS SUPPORTED BY THE WORLD BANK (1997).
56 See Manuel A. G6mez, Shooting First, and Finding out Later: ADR in the World Bank
Judicial Reform Agendas 15 (Jan. 24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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taken place without considering the context, the social and cultural
environments of the places for which they were devised.57
In general, these efforts have been driven by the idea that "modem"
institutions are a contributing factor to the creation of a competitive
environment for economic growth and social development;58 and that law is a
"potent tool for modernization in Third World Countries." Also, under this
approach, dispute processing is perceived in terms of"instrumental, optimizing
decision strategies."6 As a result, multilateral organizations have invested
billions of dollars in assistance programs to help developing countries in
modernizing their institutions; and a substantial portion of these resources has
been directed to reforming the courts, regulating the legal profession, and
improving existing legislation-including the laws referring to dispute
processing mechanisms. 6
Reform agendas have stressed the necessity for developing countries to
embrace vast institutional changes and to adopt mechanisms that are believed
to work well in modem societies.62 Consequently, the transplantof legal
institutions and models of institutionalized processes from developed nations
to developing ones has become a fairly common ingredient within these
programs.6 3 This has been the case, for example, with ADR mechanisms, the
implementation of which has been included as a key ingredient in many of
those formulas.'
Additionally, most reform plans are prescriptive in the sense that they stress
how public institutions ought to be and what successful experiences should be

57 Id.
5 Malcolm Rowat, Competition Policy in Latin America: Legal and InstitutionalIssues, in
GOOD GOVERNMENT AND LAW 165, 188 (J. Faundez ed., 1997).

9 Merry, supra note 22, at 869, 879.
Sally EngleMerry& Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept
of Dispute, 9 JuST. SYS.J. 151, 157 (1984).
61 Shahid Javed Burki, World Bank, Judicial Reform in Latin America and the
Caribbean11-12 (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 280, 1995); G6mez, supra note 56, at 8.
62 ERIK G. JENSEN & THOMAS C. HELLER, BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL
APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW (2005); THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (2006).
63 Burki, supra note 61, at 11-12.
I
" Enrique Iglesias, President, Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Keynote Address at the Conference:
Commercial Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the XXI Century: The Road Ahead for
Latin America and the Caribbean (Oct. 26, 2000).
60
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imitated.65 On the other hand, many have not valued the importance of local
ideologies or the context in which domestic institutions operate.66 According
to reform advocates, the reason why developing countries are far behind in the
success curve and are unattractive to foreign investors is because of the lack
of well-functioning, modem institutions.6 7
Developing countries are also believed to be plagued with corruption and
social inequality, which, according to this view, leads to inefficiency and
hinders democracy." In sum, the paradigm that has shaped reform agendas
and the scholarly work related to it is based on the assumption that rich and
modem countries have better, or at least better working, institutions, which
poor countries need to adopt in order to attract foreign investment and to
achieve overall economic and social progress.
Even though this quest for institutionalization and modernization may have
important advantages, the persistent focus on official bodies and the processes
that take place within them has overshadowed other important layers of society
(e.g., the informal sector) that may be perceived to work reasonably well by
locals.69 This "institutional reform" approach has also contributed to the
reaffirmation of the modem/traditional dichotomy that, as stressed before, has
pervaded the scholarly literature.
C. The Social Networks' Paradigm
As social psychologists, legal anthropologists, and institutional scholars
were developing and testing theories of disputing behavior and the ways to
process conflict, a group of scholars from different disciplines were developing
the analysis of social networks.7"
Social networks have significant
65 Burki, supranote 61, at 11-12.
66

See Merry & Silbey, supra note 60, at 159. It is worth mentioning that this structural-

functional approach has existed for a long time. In fact, its presence even predates the legal
anthropology paradigm that emerged during the 1950s, precisely as a critical response to the
structural-functional paradigm. See id. (explaining that "[e]arly proponents of the case study
approach in anthropology, such as Llewellyn and Hoebel, Gluckman, Tuner, Gulliver, and
Nader, were rebelling against a static, ahistorical (synchronic), structural-functional paradigm"
(citations omitted)).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 160.
70 See JACOB LEVY MORENO, THE SOciOMETRY READER (1960); Noel M. Tichy et al., Social
Network Analysis for Organizations,4 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 507 (1979); Reed E. Nelson, The
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implications for the study of procedural choices, which have, to date, been
largely ignored by researchers interested in dispute processing, and more
specifically by studies of preferences for ADR.
The term "social network"' denotes a set or group of individuals who are
related or connected to each other by a social relationship based on friendship,
cognatic kin,72 professional or work collegiality, economic linkage, religious
affiliation, or some other form of affinity.73 In social network theory, the
relationship between two given individuals ("nodes"74 ) is labeled as a "tie,"
and its strength depends on the combination of at least four factors: "the
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and
the reciprocal services which characterize the tie."75
One individual is usually connected to many others, who are in turn also
tied to different people by relationships of varied intensity.76 When people are
connected by multistrand, multichannel or "multiplex" relationships,7 7 strong
ties are present, and, the stronger the tie, the more cohesive the network.7"
Conversely, weak ties result from relationships that are less intense or
generally single-stranded.79 It may also occur that two people related to a third
know one another, in which case we talk about a close-knit or "high-density"

Strength ofStrong Ties: Social Networks and Intergroup Conflict in Organizations, 32 ACAD.
MGMT. J.377-401 (1989); Candance Jones et al., A General Theory of Network Governance:
Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGMT. J. 911-45 (1997).
"' See J.A. Barnes, Class and Committees in a Norwegian IslandParish, 7 HuM. REL. 39
(1954).
72 ERNEST L. SCHUSKY, MANUAL FOR KINSHIP ANALYSIs 74 (1965) ("Cognatic kin are
relatives by genealogical ties without particular emphasis on either patrilineal or matrilineal
connections.").
73 SAMUELBOWLES&HERBERT GINTIS, OPTIMALPAROCHIALISM: THE DYNAMICS OFTRUST

AND EXCLUSION INNETWORKS 2 (2000).

"4See J. Clyde Mitchell, The Concept and Use ofSocial Networks, in SOCIALNETWORKS

IN

URBAN SITUATIONS 2-3 (J. Clyde Mitchell ed., 1969).

11 Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J.SOC. 1360, 1361 (1973).
76 Mitchell, supra note 74, at 27.
11 See id. at 22. Multiplex relationships are contrasted with uniplex or single-stranded ones,
"which contain only one focus of interaction." Id.
78 Andreas Flache & Michael W. Macy, The Weakness of Strong Ties: Collective Action
Failure in a Highly Cohesive Group, in EvOLUTION OF SOCIAL NETWORKS 19, 20 (Patrick
Doreian & Frans N. Stokman eds., 1997).
19The value of weak ties has been highlighted by Granovetter, who argued that low-intensity
social connections are indispensable for mobility opportunity and to facilitate the linkage
between members of different small groups. Granovetter, supra note 75, at 1373.
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network,"° as opposed to one in which one's friends are not related among
themselves ("loose-knit network").8 '
The fact that an individual, throughout his or her life, interacts with people
from different social groups implies that he or she may also belong to different
networks.8 2 As a result, that same individual will also serve as a "broker" by
bridging together the networks to which he or she belongs.8 3 As the same
phenomenon may occur with all members of society, the different chains
("partial networks"84) that exist in a given social context can be visualized as
the building blocks of the larger social structure called a "total network."8 5
Social networks are present in every society regardless of its level of
modernity, economic affluence, political structure, or prevailing cultural
Nonetheless, the degree of cohesiveness among network
norms.8 6
participants-the network's salience, and the ways in which these structures
interact with official institutions--differs from one society to another and is
conditioned not only by the existing cultural and social norms, but also by the
presence of institutional and legal constraints that are present in the social
settings in which those networks operate. 7
As a result, there are societies or, clusters within societies, in which
interpersonal networking is deemed so important that most aspects of ordinary
life depend exclusively on the norms that emerge from the group or clan. 8

Mitchell, supranote 74, at 18.
supra note 75, at 1370.
82 See R.A. Hill & R.I.M. Dunbar, Social Network Size in Humans, 14 HuM. NAT. 53, 69
80

81 Granovetter,

(2003).
83 Conversely, several individuals maybelong to the same social network and not necessarily
be a part of or live in the same community. The network may be limited to a certain aspect of
their life.
' See J.A. Barnes, Networks and Political Process, in SOCIAL NETWORKS IN URBAN
SITUATIONS 51, 57 (J. Clyde Mitchell ed., 1969).
85 Id.; see also FRANK HARARY ET AL., STRUCTURAL MODELS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF DIRECTED GRAPHS 362-88 (1965).
86 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 41

(1995).
87 As an example, in the United States, the law severely limits the existence of interlocking
directories in private companies. This was essentially a result of the antitrust legislation passed
between 1890 and 1934 in order to dissolve the influential capital networks that emerged within
the industrial sector and monopolized the American financial markets. See PAUL WINDOLF,
CORPORATE NETWORKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 4, 5 (2002).
8 Larissa Adler Lomnitz, Informal Exchange Networks in FormalSystems: A Theoretical

Model, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 42 (1988).
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Many of these social networks have also taken part in the organization of
social structures that help monitor compliance and enforcement of rights;
hence these become a substitute for the official legal order.89
The salience of social networks in these environments results from the fact
that its members are usually linked through multiplex relationships (e.g., by
having kinsmen in common, sharing the same cultural traits, living in the same
neighborhood, having attended the same schools, and sharing intergenerational
friendships) and that the socialdistance between them is usually less than the
social distance between those who live in larger and more complex
environments. 90
Also, due to the relatively minimal social and geographical mobility that
characterizes small societies and the fact that most small societies have citizens
who share common cultural values, the ties among the citizens of these
societies tend to be durable and longstanding and to give rise to a higher level
of social cohesion. 9 In the presence of such strong social networks, insiders
(i.e., members of the network) distance themselves from outsiders (i.e., nonmembers or strangers) by limiting their loyalty only to friends, relatives, and
colleagues, and conversely, by excluding and avoiding transactions with those
who are not part of their clique.9
Scholars call this kind of exclusionary behavior "parochialism."
Parochialism may be seen as economically inefficient to the extent that it
hinders interaction between network insiders and potential outside partners.93

19Id. The emergence of these private ordering structures is often portrayed as a direct
consequence of the failure of official institutions in performing their role. See John McMillan
& Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MIcH. L.
REV. 2421 (2000). However, there are circumstances in which social groups have devised their
own private ordering regardless of how official institutions operate. See Richman, supra
note 47, at 2328-67.
90 Granovetter, supra note 75, at 1361 n.3. The idea of social distance is directly related to
the concept of reachabilitythat is used to describe the fact that "every specified person can be
contacted within a stated number of steps from any given starting point." Mitchell, supra
note 74, at 15. This also has a direct consequence on the level of network cohesiveness. See id.
9' See James Moody & Douglas R. White, Structural Cohesion and Embeddedness: A
HierarchicalConcept of Social Groups, 68 AM. Soc. REV. 103, 105 (2003) (analyzing the
notion of social cohesion, structural cohesion, and embeddedness).
92 Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Optimal Parochialism:The Dynamics of Trust and
Exclusion in Networks 2 (Santa Fe Inst., Working Paper No. 00-03-017, 2000), availableat
http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/workingpapers/00-03-017.pdf.
93 Id. at 2-3.
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On the other hand, parochial practices may also generate efficiency for
network participants who, as a result, have access to low cost information
about their trading partners and are also allowed to effectively enforce
incomplete contracts through different forms of social coercion, which are only
possible in small group settings. 94
In contrast, there is another type of society (generally, larger ones), in
which social networks are still important, but their overall influence seems to
be less apparent as a result of social, cultural, economic, and legal
constraints.95 Members of these large societies tend to interact with many
more people than their counterparts from small ones.96 Their social circles
may be larger, too, but their exchanges tend also to be briefer and more
superficial. 97 The complexity of life in large and generally urban environments
also generates more social and geographical mobility, which in turn works
towards creating less cohesive networks where the difference between insiders
and outsiders is more difficult to notice. 98
Since the 1930s, scholars from different disciplines (most notably,
anthropology, sociology, and psychology) have systematically explored the
intricacies of group dynamics and have worked towards developing an
important body of literature pertaining to the study of social networks. 99
Despite the diverging theoretical traits across those disciplines, social
scientists interested in the field have devised a common terminology' 0 and a
distinctive approach to explore the ways in which small-scale social
interactions occur and also how these influence both individual and collective
behavior.'"' The social network approach usually includes diagrams, which
include all relevant nodes and ties, and focuses on the attributes of
interpersonal relationships by measuring the degree of relatedness among

94Id. at

3.

"sMitchell, supranote 74, at 48.
96

Id.

97Id.

9'Franz H6linger & Max Hailer, Kinship and Social Networks in Modern Societies: A
Cross-CulturalComparisonAmong Seven Nations, 6 EuR. Soc. REV. 103, 105 (1990).
99JOHN ScoTT, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIs: A HANDBOOK 7 (2d ed. 2000).
'00 Id. The notion of "network" itself and several other terms used in social network analysis
(i.e., intensity, frequency, nodes, ties, links) are taken from graph theory; whereas some others
(e.g., multiplexity, intensity, close-knit) are from sociology or anthropology. Id. at 8-10.
101Mitchell, supra note 74, at 2.
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individuals °2 rather than simply focusing on the qualities of individual actors,
the social categories to which they belong, 3 or more abstract social
structures. 14
Social network analysis has been used to interpret interpersonal behavior
in a variety of social phenomena and has contributed to understanding the
usefulness of contacts for job-seeking purposes,"'S the way in which
organizations are run,10 6 how social structure affects economic life,"°7 the
dissemination of information, rumors or ideas,0" and the mapping of
corruption, 09terrorists," 0 and other criminal organizations."' Social networks
have also been the subject of widespread speculation in popular culture," 2 and

generally THE SOCIOMETRY READER 3 (J.L. Moreno ed., 1960). Moreno coined the
term "sociometry" to define the body of knowledge applied to measuring social relationships.
One of Moreno's major contributions was the" 'sociogram' as a way of representing the formal
properties of social configurations ....in diagrams analogous to those of spatial geometry."
SCOTT,supra note 99, at 9-10. Modem social network scholars have traced the origins of the
contemporary social networks analysis to the fundamental ideas of sociometry. See Granovetter,
supra note 75, at 1360.
103Mitchell, supranote 74, at 10 ("[T]he categoricalorderby means of which the behaviour
of people in unstructured situations may be interpreted in terms of social stereotypes such as
class, race, ethnicity . .
102 See

104Id. at 4.

"

See, e.g., MARK S. GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACTS AND CAREERS

(1974).
..
6 See, e.g., Tichy et al., supranote 70; see also Nelson, supra note 70; Jones et al., supra
note 70.
117 See Brian Uzzi, Social Structureand Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradoxof
Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35 (1997).
"I See James Coleman et al., The Diffusion of an Innovation among Physicians, 20
SOCIOMETRY

253 (1957); see also Max Gluckman, Gossip and Scandal, 4 CURRENT
Gossip, Norms and Social Networks, in SOCIAL

ANTHROPOLOGY 307 (1963); A. L. Epstein,

NETWORKS INURBAN SITUATIONS, supra note 74, at 117.
1"9See, e.g., John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in
Peru, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (2004).
"10

MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS (2004); Apama Basu, Social

Network Analysis of Terrorist Organizations in India (unpublished article presented at Carnegie
Mellon University 2005, available at http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/events/conferences/2005/
2005_proceedings/Basu.pdf).
" Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner, The Social Organizationof Conspiracy:Illegal
Networks in the Heavy ElectricalEquipment Industry, 58 AM. SOC. REv. 837 (1993); Jeffrey
Scott McIllwain, OrganizedCrime: A Social Network Approach, 32 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE
301 (1999); Nigel Coles, It's Not What You Know-It's Who You Know That Counts. Analysing
Serious Crime Groups as Social Networks, 41 BRIT. J. CRIM. 580 (2001).
112 Perhaps the most widely known idea related to social networks is that of "six degrees of
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a notable interest on them has grown exponentially with the expansion of the
3
Internet.' 1
In spite of its growing usage in other disciplines, the social network
approach seems to have been overlooked by socio-legal scholars. In fact, most
of the traditional literature pertaining to social control in legal environments
has either focused on individual legal actors and the social categories to which
they belong (categorical approach) or on the behavior of these actors
depending on the role that they occupy within social institutions (structural
approach)." 4 It could be said, for instance, that these approaches are the ones
that have guided the scholarship produced under the Procedural Justice and the
Structural Paradigms described earlier, and to a certain extent, have also
influenced the legal anthropology paradigm as well." 5

separation," according to which any two people in the world can be connected through no more
than five acquaintances. This hypothesis was originally conceived by the Hungarian writer
Frigyes Karinthy in a short story entitled Ldnceszemek (Chains), but did not become popular
until after 1967, when American psychologist Stanley Milgram conducted his "Small World
Problem" experiment intended to test the six degrees hypothesis. See Stanley Milgram,
PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1967, at 60; see also Jeffrey Travers & Stanley Milgram, An
Experimental Study of the Small World Problem, 32 SOCIOMETRY 425 (1969). However,
Milgram's findings and the Six Degrees hypothesis in general, have been recently criticized. See
Judith Kleinfeld, Six Degrees of Separation:An Urban Myth?, PsYcHOL. TODAY, Mar.-Apr.
2002, available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-20020301-000038.html; see
also Judith Kleinfeld, Could It Be a Big World After All? The "Six Degrees of Separation"
Myth, SOCIETY, 2002, available at http://www.uaf.edu/northem/bigworld.html.
113 See Lee Sproull & Samer Faraj, Atheism, Sex, and Databases: The Net as a Social
Technology, in CULTURE OF THE INTERNET 35-38 (Sara Kiesler ed., 1997). Since the midnineties, numerous websites dedicated to promoting social networking for a variety of purposes
have been launched (e.g., classmates.com, linkedin.com, sixdegrees.com, myspace.com,
orkut.com, Yahoo360, and the popular facebook.com).
"4 Mitchell, supra note 74, at 9-10.
..
5 The procedural justice literature has focused on the behavior of individuals (categorical)
and the choices that they make given the existing social institutions (structural); the institutional
paradigm has instead focused almost exclusively on the social structure (structural) while paying
no attention to the individual (categorical). See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Legal
anthropologists have also, to a certain extent, focused on the structure of traditional societies and
have explored the behavior of individuals according to the position that they occupy in the social
system. Mitchell, supra note 74, at 9. However, when anthropologists began studying more
complex societies, urban communities, "small scale societies which lacked single pervasive
structural characteristics in terms of which their morphologies could be depicted .... [They]
found the structural approach inadequate." See id. As a result, some sociologists and
anthropologists began employing social network tools but most of their research was focused on
the analysis of close-knit and homogeneous communities and their preference for processes that
were labeled as indigenous or primitive, thus reaffirming the modem/primitive society dichotomy
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The structural and categorical approaches have provided important
contributions in different contexts. 16 Nonetheless, as none of these
approaches focuses on social interactions and the ways in which individual
behavior is affected by the social context," 7 researchers have been able to
obtain only a partial view of how institutions and social processes operate.
The social network approach can help obtain a more complete picture by
considering context as an important element." 8 To this end, social network
analysis may be used as a vehicle to explore the way in which individuals cope
with interpersonal conflict within social group settings, to understand the ways
in which group norms are effectively enforced in the absence of a centralized
formal authority" 9 (e.g., enforcement of incomplete contracts), and most
importantly, to explain the influence of the social context on individual choices
for dispute processing mechanisms and fora, in a way that goes beyond the
traditional dichotomy that views societies as either traditional or modem. 2 0
Ultimately, such analysis could also shed light on the understanding of the role
of conflict in the transformation and maintenance of social structures.
The presence of social networks is a feature common to every society.' 2'
Virtually every culture in the world considers personal exchange an essential
part of life, and the building of social capital through "multiplex, affectual and

to which we have previously referred. Id.
16 See supra Part III.
"1 It could be argued, however, that the "new legal pluralism" paradigm constitutes an
exception because it not only looks at the social interactions, but also at the "unofficial forms of
ordering located in social networks or institutions." Merry, supra note 22, at 869, 873.
118 Robert Huckfeldt & John Sprague, Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political
Information, 81 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 1197 (1987).
"9 Even though some of its members may have more predominant roles than others, social
networks usually do not have a head or a leader.
120 In fact, as Mitchell points out:
[T]he use of the notion of social networks in the interpretation of field
data .... [w]as introduced into British social anthropology in the first
instance particularly because the conventional categories of
structural/functional analysis did not appear to be adequate when
anthropologists began to make studies outside the ordinary run ofsmall-scale,
isolated 'tribal' societies.
See Mitchell, supra note 74, at 8. The weakness of the structural approach is that it "involve[s]
generalizations about the behaviour of people in terms of the positions they occupy in the social
system but that these generalizations based as they are on abstractions ignore individual
deviations from the pattern." Id.at 9.
121 FUKUYAMA, supra note 86.
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enduring" interactions is usually linked to the acquisition of social and
economic benefits.' 22 Relationships that arise from business exchanges are no
different. After all, deal making is a form of social interface, and the repeated
interaction within groups of individuals plays an important role in fulfilling
social and economic functions.' 23
In light of the fact that social relationships are generally perceived as
paramount in business and deal making, the business community offers an
ideal set of conditions for the use of social network analysis. The importance
of this topic is reflected by the amount of scholarly research conducted to
26
25
24
illustrate business social networks in Asian,1 African, North-American,1
and European 127 cultures as well.
Many important facets of the business community can be examined through
the lens of social networks, but the most relevant dimension for legal scholars
is that dimension which is related to the influence of social interactions on
dispute processing behavior. 28 As the salient influence of social networks
depends largely on the unique characteristics of every society, it is only by
looking at the context in which these networks operate that we can understand
their impact on the ways in which normative orderings can coexist within a
122 Abel,

supra note 1, at 294.

2' WINDOLF, supra note 87, at 25 ("Corporate networks perform a number of economic

functions: reducing informational asymmetries (e.g. weak ties); reducing uncertainty (e.g. trust);
the supervision of managers by owners (principal-agent problem); redistributing risk (risksharing); diffusion of innovations within an 'organizational field'; reducing (mutual) resource
dependency; selecting and recruiting successful managers (screening)." (citations omitted)).
124 See ASIAN BUSINESS NETWORKS (Gary G. Hamilton ed., 1996); CHAN KWOK-BON,
MIGRATION, ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CHINESE BUSINESS (2005); Mark Granovetter, Business
Groups and Social Organization, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 429 (Neil J.
Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005).
125 Marcel Fafchamps, The Enforcement ofCommercialContractsin Ghana,24 WORLD DEV.
427 (1996); Marcel Fafchamps, Networks, Communities, and Markets in Sub-SaharanAfrica:
Implicationsfor Firm Growth and Investment, 10 J. AFR. ECON. 109 (2001).
126Macaulay, supra note 21; Stewart Macaulay, Long-Term Continuing Relations: The
American ExperienceRegulating Dealershipsand Franchises,in FRANCHISING AND THE LAW:
THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACHES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 179 (C.

Joerges ed., 1991); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 136 (1996); Robert E. Scott,
Conflict and Cooperationin Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2049 (1987); Emilio
J.Castilla et al., Social Networks in Silicon Valley, in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE: A HABITAT
FOR INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 218 (Chong-Moon Lee et al. eds., 2000).
127 WINDOLF, supra note 87.
128 See Abel, supra note 1, at 225.
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given society. This is why this Article now attempts to explain the social and
cultural environments under which the Venezuelan business sector operates.
IV. ALL IN THE FAMILY: SOCIAL STRUCTURE, NETWORKS AND THE
VENEZUELAN BUSINESS SECTOR

"[C]lubreunions andbirthdaypartiesserve as a time to discuss
business strategies, and board meetings serve as a time to
discussfamily matters."129

A. Black Gold: The Impact of an Oil-based Economy on the Venezuelan
Society
During the twentieth century, Venezuela became known as the longeststanding and most stable democracy in Latin America. 130 This reputation
resulted mainly because starting in 1958, and for more than forty years, the
country was among the very few in the region where elections were
periodically held, a formal separation of powers existed allowing the different
branches of the state to be independent, citizens' rights were not only
mentioned in the laws but also guaranteed to some extent, and the supremacy
of the law (rule of law) was generally accepted.'31 The perception of political
and social stability was enhanced by the idea of economic prosperity.' 32 By the
1960s, as a result of the massive wealth coming largely from oil exports and,
iron,
to a lesser extent, from other natural resources (natural gas, bauxite, and
133
among others) Venezuela became generally regarded as a rich nation.

129 Jatar, supra note 24, at 111.

130FERNANDO CORONIL, THE MAGICAL STATE: NATURE, MONEY AND MODERNITY IN

VENEZUELA 367-68 (1997). Almost all other Latin American countries have had long periods
of dictatorship and totalitarian regimes, or to a certain extent, have only enjoyed democracy for
limited periods of time. Id.
131See id; Howard J. Wiarda & leda Siqueira Wiarda, Government and Politics, in
VENEZUELA: A COUNTRY STUDY 133, 135, 154 (Richard A. Haggerty ed., 4th ed. 2002).
132 TERRY LYNN KARL, THE

(1997).

133Id. at 3.

PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATEs 71-188
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To this day, Venezuela is still the third largest oil producer in the world.134
As a founding and a very proactive member of Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), the international oil cartel created in 1960 that
congregates mostly Middle Eastern oil rich nations, Venezuela has been a key
player in the global trade of natural resources for several decades.' 35 Though
the industry employs less than 2% of the labor workforce, oil revenues have
traditionally represented more than 90% of the country's revenue from36exports
and at least one-fifth of Venezuela's gross national product (GNP).1
During the nineteenth century, however, Venezuela was a rural country
whose economy relied on small-scale exports of coffee and cocoa.' 37 In fact,
when the first important oil reservoirs were discovered in 1914, Venezuela did
not have the technology or infrastructure to exploit and commercialize
hydrocarbons, and as a result, the government had no other option but to let
foreign oil corporations (FOC) handle the business.'38
At the time, major oil companies, mainly from the United States and
Western Europe, were among the most influential corporate actors in the
world.' 39 The fact that these companies were completely owned and managed
by foreigners contributed to the creation of a perception among Venezuelans
that these entities represented a form of alien domination. 4 ° In addition, the
market presence of these financially powerful and technologically advanced
actors and the contrast that they represented with respect to the local economic

134 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, MONTHLY OIL MARKET REPORT

6 (May 12, 2006),

availableathttp://onmrpublic.iea.org/tablearchivesearchres.asp?select5=2006&Submit222=Sub
mit.
"' Current members of OPEC are: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. See OPEC,
About Us, http://www.opec.org/aboutus/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
136 Terry Lynn Karl, Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in
Venezuela, 22 LATIN AM. RESEARCH REv. 63 (1987).
13 Miguel Izard, Periodde la lndepenciay La Gran Colombia: 1810-1830, POLITICA Y
ECONOMIA EN VENEZUELA: 1810-1976, at 3 (Alfredo Boulton ed., 1976).
13' Guillermo Rodriguez Eraso, Evoluci6n de la Industria Petrolera en Venezuela, in
SEMBRANDO EL PETR6LEO 33, 35 (2001).
139 WAYNE CHATFIELD TAYLOR & JOHN LINDEMAN TAYLOR, THE CREOLE PETROLEUM
CORPORATION IN VENEZUELA 1,22 (1976); B.S. MCBETH, JUAN VICENTE GMEZ AND THE OIL
COMPANIES IN VENEZUELA: 1908-1935, at 70 (2002). Standard Oil Co. (Creole Petroleum Co.)

and Shell were the two dominant players in the Venezuelan market for more than fifty years,
until the government's decision to nationalize the industry in 1975. CORONIL, supra note 130,
at 108.
140 Arturo Uslar Pietri, EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.), May 27, 1991, at D6.
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players, "created the sense that the country was dominated by an
uncontrollable power totally stranger to the Venezuelan society and to its
possibilities, and which could defy the laws of Venezuela and even its
sovereignty."''
During the 1960s, the Venezuelan government reacted to the potential
foreign threat by devising protectionist strategies which it then implemented
through import substitution policies, extensive price controls, fixed interest
rates, and legislation that required government permits and government
authorizations for almost all of business life. 4 2 These policies were enacted
not only to impede the threats of foreign competition but also to hinder local
rivalry.' 43 For businesspeople, the only way to navigate successfully through
the complicated web of administrative processes and the immense bureaucracy
that emerged from the sudden growth of the state apparatus was by relying on
their personal connections with government officials. 1" This did not prove to
be an obstacle for domestic businesspeople, given that most of them, as part
of the local social elite, were already familiar with the benefit of using
personal connections for their own advantage. 45 Social networks may not
economic boom, but this certainly made them
have emerged as an effect of this
46
1
important.
more
stronger and
In 1975, the oil industry was nationalized, thus enabling the Venezuelan
47 The new
state to formally become the sole ruler of its own wealth.
mining reservoirs were of public
legislation provided that all hydrocarbons and
148
interest and therefore belonged to the state.

141

Id.

142

Jatar, supra note 24.

143 Id.
14

Id.

145ROBERT J. FERRY, THE COLONIAL ELTE OF EARLY CARACAS: FORMATION AND CRisis,

1567-1767, at 217 (1989).
'" Kenneth M. Roberts, Social CorrelatesofParty System Demise and PopulistResurgence
in Venezuela, 45 LAT. AM. POL. & Soc. 35, 39, 44 (2003).
141 Mona Verma Makhija, Government Intervention in the Venezuelan PetroleumIndustry:
An EmpiricalInvestigationof PoliticalRisk, 24 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 531, 533 (1993).
4' See Ley Organica que Reserva al Estado la Industria y el Comercio de los Hidrocarburos
(LDH) [HydrocarbonsAct] (1975) (Venez.), availableat http://www.villarroelsierraalta.com/
spanish/Portales/villarroelsierraalta%5Cdata%5C264.pdf; see also CONSTITUcI6N DE LA
REPOBUCABOLIVARIANADE VENEZUELA [Constitutionof the BolivarianRepublicof Venezuela]
art. 12 (Venez.).
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By being blessed (or cursed)'4 9 with such a significant source of wealth
from oil and other natural resources, the different administrations that ruled the
country during the second half of the twentieth century found themselves in the
position of playing a major role in shaping the economy. 5 ° As a result of the
financial bonanza created by the oil revenues, the state became the owner and
sponsor of many economic activities and became a key player in most areas of
the industrial and business sectors. 5 ' The government was not only the richest
investor but also an important benefactor.152 This in turn "imposed on the
private sector the necessity for organizing and mobilizing politically so it can
be first in line to benefit from rent distribution."'5 In addition, members of the
business community were expected to pledge allegiance to the ruling political
' 54
party as is common in relationships based on "clientelism."'
With a need to invest and diversify its income, the state became involved
in almost every important economic activity ranging from the obvious and
arguably essential investments in oil, steel, and other heavy industries to areas
in which liberal governments rarely participate, like airlines, hotels, telephone
companies, and mass media.'5 5 Such interventionism led to an expansion of
the government's presence to include virtually every aspect of the economy
56
and helped to strengthen the links between the public and the private sectors. 1

"'9See CORONIL,
15oSee CoRoNIL,

supra note 130, at 353-56; see also KARL, supra note 132.
supra note 130, at 353-56; see also KARL, supra note 132.

151ALLAN BREWER-CARiAS, RtGIMEN JURIDICO DE LAS EMPRESAS PUJBLICAS EN VENEZUELA

(1981).
152 Kevin Neuhouser, Democratic Stability in Venezuela: Elite Consensus or Class
Compromise?, 57 AM. SOC. REv. 117, 117 (1992).
153Jatar, supra note 24, at 111.
114Jonathan Fox, The Difficult Transitionfrom Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessonsfrom
Mexico, 46 WORLD POL. 151, 153 (1994).

The term "clientelism" usually refers to "a

relationship based on political subordination in exchange for material rewards." Id. In this
manner, "politicians intervene, on behalf of voters, in the administrative process, and, in return,
voters reward politicians with votes." See Lee Komito, Voters, Politiciansand Clientelism:A
Dublin Survey, 37 ADMIN. 171, 171 (1989).
155BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 151.

Manuel A. G6mez, The Use of Institutional Mediation by Venezuelan Business Lawyers
31 (May 13, 2002) (unpublished J.S.M. thesis, Stanford University, available at http://www.
law.stanford.edu/publications/dissertationstheses/diss/MAGomez-ta2002.pdf).
156
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B. Friends Go First:The Importanceof the Know- Who over the Know-How'5 7
As the state apparatus grew exponentially and started intervening in most
areas of the economy, it became paramount to those who wanted to succeed in
Obviously, certain groups
business to cultivate the "proper" connections.'
achieved more power than others, and as a result, they were more successful
in their business activities, often at the expense of others.
Venezuela has a racially mixed population, 159 as a result of the many waves
of immigration beginning in the late nineteenth century, which mainly
originated from Western Europe.160 The country now has more than twentyfive million inhabitants, but the society is still visibly stratified. 16 ' The general
population has grown exponentially during the last decades, but the key
players in the business community are from of the same groups that have
maintained an advantageous position in society by excluding "outsiders" and
62
have dominated the social and economic scene for years.
He might have an MBA from Harvard or another important university; he
might be an accomplished individual but he's not clearly one of us, so when
we are deciding who to hire or who to do business with, we need to give
preference to those who have our same beliefs, philosophy, and who are close
of our group of friends. Even if they don't have all the credentials, we can
always trust them more than the strangers. After all friends go first, you
know ....
Interview with Venezuelan business executive, in Caracas, Venezuela (May 12, 2006). Please
note, all interviews are on file with author.
158 See LAS EMPRESAS VENEZOLANAS: SU GERENCIA, supra note 24, at 10.
157

19 See CHRIS TANNER, VENEZUELAN MIGRATION (1980).
160

For a comprehensive history of the European immigration in Venezuela see NICOLAS

MILLE, VEINTE ANOS DE MUSTUES: ASPECTOS HIST6RICOs, SOCIOLOGICOS Y JURiDICOS DE LA
INMIGRACI6N EUROPEA DE VENEZUELA (1965); CHI-YI CHEN, MOVIAENTOS MIGRATORIOS EN
VENEZUELA (1968); ERMILA TROCONIS DE VERACOECHEA, EL PROCESO DE INMIGRACI6N EN
VENEZUELA (1986); ADELA PELLEGRINO, HISTORIA GENERAL DE LA INMIGRAC[ON EN VENEZUELA

SIGLOS XIX Y XX (1989); Mauro Baffle, La Inmigraci6n Europea de la Postguerra,in LA
INMIGRACI6N EN VENEZUELA (Isbelia Sequera Tamayo & Rafael Jose Crazut eds., 1992).
161 ROBERTO BRICEf4O-LE6N, VENEZUELA: CLASES SOCIALES E INDIVIDUOS (1992); TOMAS
VASCONI, EL ESTADO Y LAS CLASES DOMINANTES EN LA VENEZUELA ACTUAL (1977).
162 FRANK PARKIN, MARXISM AND CLASS THEORY: A BOURGEOIS CRITIQUE 44 (1979). The

notion of "exclusionary social closure" was greatly developed by Frank Parkin, who explained
it as "the process by which social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access
to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles. This entails the singling out of
certain social or physical attributes as the justificatory basis of exclusion." Id. at 44-45. This
notion is also related to the concept of parochialismin social network theory described earlier.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Some areas within the business sector still appear to be controlled by
groups of a common ethnic background, but the larger community is able to
form into a relatively cohesive group of people who are bound by multiplex
social relationships where families are members of the same social clubs,
children attend the same private schools and they travel to the same places for
vacation. 163 Social networks have influence over most aspects of business life,
and the processing of disputes is not an exception.164
Whenever legal conflicts arise, the first move on each side is usually to
resort to the network. 65 Since business relationships are so intertwined with
personal ties and the degree of social cohesiveness is high, it is common for
disputants to sort out their differences with the intervention of other members
of their social group, which may also be part of their family.' 66 When conflicts
get out of hand, and the contending parties are not members of the same social
group, or the intervention of official institutions is deemed necessary for any
other reason, disputants utilize the official fora, but still through their social
networks.' 6 7 In this sense, lawyers have become important players within the
business sector because they are the ones who usually interact with official
6
institutions and serve as liaisons or brokers between different social groups. 1
Family-owned businesses are still very common in the Venezuelan private
sector. 169 Most large and medium-sized companies are still owned or
controlled by members of the same families, which has facilitated the
strengthening of social business networks, and has helped to maintain an
important level of social cohesion between groups. 7 ' As a result of these
multiplex ties, social hierarchies have extended to business relationships, and
often play an important role in shaping the way in which dealings are

163See, e.g., Jatar, supranote 24. One distinctive feature of these social circles is the high

degree of cohesiveness among its members, which often extends to more than one generation,
thus creating a close-knit network.
'6 Manuel A. G6mez, Los Abogados de Negocios en Venezuela, 125 REVISTA DE LA
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURiDICAS Y POLITICAS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD CENTRAL DE VENEZUELA,
CARACAS 23, 40 (2003).
165 Id.

Id.
Id. at 43.
168 See id. at 23-50.
169Interestingly, this also seems to be the case of corporate ownership around the world, as
166
167

families dominate most firms both in developing and advanced economies. See Granovetter,
supranote 124, at 433.
170 Id.
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conducted and disputes are dealt with. 7' Conversely, business issues are in
turn mixed with family life and social relationships.'7 2 As Jatar has eloquently
pointed out, "club reunions and birthday parties serve as a time to discuss
business strategies and board meetings serve as a time to discuss family
matters."'

71 3

To an outsider, the Venezuelan business sector appears to enjoy a level of
modernity typically found in industrialized and affluent societies.'7 4 But after
a closer look, this modernity reveals itself to be a facade for two reasons: first,
family and social relationships still have more weight than individual merits
and, second, the success of most corporations and individual businesspeople
depends more on their political and social connections than on their capacity
to compete and innovate.'7 5 7In6 other words, the know-who is much more
important than the know-how.1
In sum, while social networks had been important in Venezuela for many
years, the particular features of the modem state and the socio-economic
reality that emerged as a result of the oil boom made them even more relevant,
not only for the success of business activities, but also for dealing with
disputes that arose among business actors.' 77 As will be discussed in the
following Parts, social networks have permeated private and public institutions
and the individual decisions of businesspeople to use the different kinds of
dispute processes heavily depends on them.'78

"' G6mez, supranote 164.
172 Id.
173 Jatar, supra note 24, at 111.
114 See generally LAS EMPRESAS VENEZOLANAS: Su GERENCIA, supra note 24.
175

Id.

176 Id.
177 id.
171

See infra Parts V and VI.
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V. FROM THE TRIBES TO THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION: THE PERSISTENT
INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE VENEZUELAN COURTS

"Mas vale tener media vara de Juez que una vara de Justicia"
(It is better to have a judge's shortyardstick than a long one of
justice)17 9

A. Demystifying JudicialInefficiency
One of the most common critiques of the judiciary in Latin America is that
it is inefficient, and Venezuelan courts are not an exception. 8 ' The common
perception is that courts are unable to deliver a just and equitable resolution
of disputes in a timely manner."' Processes are believed to be slow, the
backlog is thought to be enormous and the costs for using the justice system
are believed to be prohibitive for many disputants, especially for the poor.'82
In general terms, efficiency implies achieving desired results by
maximizing the use of available resources.' 83 In plain words efficiency refers
to the idea of doing more by spending less and still being able to reach an
optimal outcome. Efficiency is usually measured through objective parameters
like cost, which refers not only to the obvious monetary dimension but also
to other aspects as the time or duration of a process before an expected result
is achieved.' 8 5

In the case of courts, for example, the issue of cost refers both to the direct
monetary value to the parties, and also to how much society in general-or the
government, in more concrete terms-needs to invest in order to make the

179Venezuelan saying commonly employed by lawyers to express that it is better to have (the
favor of) a judge on our side than the favor ofjustice.
180 ROGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, POLITICAS JUDICIALES EN VENEZUELA 15 (1995).
181 Id.
'82

Jose Alberto Ramirez Le6n, Why FurtherDevelopment ofADR in Latin America Makes

Sense: The Venezuelan Model, 2005 J. DisP. RESOL. 399, 400, 403 (2005).
183PETER H. ROSSI ET AL., EVALUATION: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
184 The

332 (7th ed. 2004).

notion of cost not only refers to "direct expenditures but also indirect and intangible
costs." See CAROL H. WEISS, EVALUATION 244 (2d ed. 1997).
185 Efficiency analysis (cost-effectiveness analysis) offers a possibility of assessing resource
allocation by comparing benefits to costs in non-commensurable terms. See ROSSI ET AL., supra
note 183, at 366; see also WEISS, supra note 184, at 244 (describing the uses of a cost-efficiency
analysis for program evaluation).
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system work.'86 The variable "time" is logically attributed to the duration of
trials, that is, how long takes from the moment when a complaint is filed to the
moment when the decision or final ruling is rendered.
Another evaluation parameter used to assess efficiency is "users'
satisfaction,"'' 8 7 that is, asking how pleased people are with the system, and
how they perceive it to address their needs or aspirations.
However, at least in Venezuela, the government has traditionally viewed
the activity of the courts as an extension of the state's omnipotent power and
not as a public service that should be geared to respond to citizens in a manner
that satisfies them and fulfills their needs. 88 Hence, the real perception of
users is not deemed important and this might explain why there has been little
or no concern about what citizens in general think about the judiciary.189
Notwithstanding this, as judicial reform agendas emerged, it became
important to pay attention, or appear to pay attention, to disputants'
perceptions about the system. 9 ° One of the best selling points used to justify
the need for reform in the judiciary was the belief that citizens have a negative
opinion about the court system; and to give credibility to this claim, reform
advocates have usually seasoned their assertions with anecdotes of unusual and
atypical cases and with data from opinion polls. 9 ' Scholars also seem to
endorse the belief that people in general avoid the courts because of their
perceived inefficiency.192

"86PEREZ-PERDOMO, supranote 180, at 15.
817LuISPASARA, REFORMAS JURiDICAS EN AMERICA LATINA: CUENTAYBALANCE 29 (2004).
88

Rogelio P~rez-Perdomo, Medio Siglo de HistoriaJudicialen Venezuela (1952-2005), 1

DERECHO Y DEMOCRACIA 6 (2006).
189 Id.

9I Eduardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, Judicial Reform in Latin American Courts: The
Experience in Argentina and Equador4 (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 350, 1996).
9' Deborah R. Hensler, Senior Fellow, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Address at the
Conference: New Approaches for Meeting the Demand of Justice: The Contribution of Judicial
Reform to the Rule of Law 7 (May 10, 2001) (transcript available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.orgINTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/henslerspeech.pdt) (stressing that exceptional
cases (outliers), and not the common ones, are usually considered as typical and extrapolated to
describe "the system as a whole, forgetting that what attracted our attention in the first place was
the fact that these were exceptional cases").
192PEREZ-PERDOMO, supranote 180, at 16 ("[In spite of the lack of data and the complexity
of the evaluation, as a hypothesis we could state that the satisfaction of Venezuelans with their
justice system is low and that one of the signs for this is the relatively scarce use of the courts
when citizens are able to avoid using it."); see also Rogelio Pdrez-Perdomo, De la Justiciay
Otros Demonios, in SEGURIDAD JURiDICA Y COMPETrrIVIDAD 117, 126 (M.E. Boza & Rogelio
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But an interesting aspect here-often overlooked by reform advocates-is
that efficiency has different meanings to different groups of stakeholders.'9 3
From the institutional standpoint, for example, efficient courts are those that
are deemed capable of delivering a just and expeditious resolution of disputes
at a relatively low cost to both disputants and the state, and in that way, to
contribute to preserving the common welfare.' 94 Efficiency is also deemed
very important in promoting the rule of law.'95
To individual disputants or certain groups of disputants, efficiency may be
perceived very differently. Their understanding of an efficient court may be
that of an institution that allows them to achieve a favorable resolution to their
specific dispute regardless of the positive or negative impact that it might have
upon the interest of society in general. 196 Speedy trials may be desirable for
plaintiffs but not for defendants; and low cost dispute-processing may be an
aspiration of poor litigants but not of wealthy ones, who may even find it
advantageous to engage in a costly trial, particularly if it represents a burden
to their poorer adversary.
This gap between the views of private citizens and that of the state can be
explained by the fact that the private incentive of disputants to use the legal
system is different than the social incentive to use it.'97 Disputants care more
about their own costs than the costs of the other party or of the state.198 While
the political system seeks to consolidate democracy, make the legal system
transparent, responsible to social needs, and accessible to the disadvantaged,
private disputants may only want to use the system to resolve a particular
dispute, vindicate their rights, or simply renegotiate with the other party. 199
The data obtained from interviews with current and potential business
disputants in Venezuela seem to confirm this assertion.

Nrez-Perdomo eds., 1996); Mois6s Naim, Viejas Costumbres y Nuevas Realidades en la
Gerencia Venezolana, in LAS EMPRESAS VENEZOLANAS: Su GERENCIA, supranote 24, at 493,
511.
"' Hensler, supra note 191, at 6.
194 Id.
195 Id.

196Steven Shavell, The FundamentalDivergenceBetween the Privateandthe Social Motive
to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577-78 (1997).
197 Id.
198Id.

'99Id. at 579.
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In principle, the majority of the business disputants interviewed for this
study seemed to agree with the idea that the judiciary is corrupt and works
unequally; but at the same time, they expressed a preference for using it
and-to a large extent-considered it to fulfill their needs; in other words, they
generally viewed the system as efficient in spite of the conventional wisdom.
The Efficiency of "Malfunctioning" Courts
At first glance, members of the Venezuelan business community seem to
agree with the criticism that is often expressed in media reports.20 ° I started
most of the interviews by asking people about their perceptions of the
judiciary, and the majority of the respondents echoed similar complaints about
the bad situation of the courts in general. Many people spent time commenting
about the poor condition of the court buildings, the lack of modern equipment,
and the frequent strikes by court employees protesting that their salaries were
not paid on time.
Lawyers, naturally, emphasized the problems of access to the court
facilities since they are the ones who are supposed to use them on a daily
basis.2" 1 One is left to imagine how burdensome it is for lawyers in Caracas
to stand in line for a half-hour or more to get into the elevators to enter the
court building; only to wait in another line at the doors of the archives to
access the docket containing the documents filed in their case; and then wait
again to speak with the clerk, to file a brief, or to request a copy of a court
record. In principle, this entire process may take hours and, arguably, lawyers
have to go through it several times a week.

200 Ricardo Combellas, La Copre ante la UrgenciaJudicial,EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.), Nov.

15, 1996, available at http://buscador.eluniversal.com/1996/11/15/opiart_Ml5CO.shtml;
Rogelio Pdrez-Perdomo, iCudl Reforma Judicial?, EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.), Dec. 3, 1996,
availableathttp://buscador.eluniversal.com/1 996/12/ 0 3 /opi art_27344.shtml; Julio Borges, No
HabriRevoluci6nen Venezuela sin Reforma Judicial,ELUNIVERSAL (Venez.), Nov. 28,2004,
availableat http://buscador.eluniversal.com/2004/11/28/pol ava_28A511533.shtml.
201 However, in the case of medium-size and large firms, it is the paralegals or the associates
who usually go to the courts on a daily basis to check if there is anything new in the docket.
According to Venezuelan law, the courts are supposed to give notice to the parties about
important events, but it is a custom among Venezuelan lawyers to personally appear before the
court and review the file at least three times a week. This is a time-consuming activity but it is
the only way of keeping reliable information up to date.
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The clients, instead, usually talked about strikes or more general problems,
and interestingly, most of the time their knowledge did not seem to come from
first hand experience but rather, from media reports or rumors.2 2 Those
interviewed in general commented that it would be desirable if the government
spent more resources in improving the courts, but also acknowledged that the
current situation does not create a real barrier that prevents them or their
clients from using the system.
After hearing all these complaints regarding the system, I expected people
to report that they avoided using the courts most of the time. However, when
conversations with business lawyers turned to the specifics about their
practice, most of them revealed a preference for choosing the commercial
courts. 20 3 At the outset, almost no one admitted to the fact that the bulk of their
cases, which are not negotiated or informally-mediated, are processed through
courts. Lawyers seemed inclined to say that "the court system is a mess, only
with a few exceptions," 2" but it turned out that these "exceptions" turned out
to be the rule. During my interviews with business lawyers, I could confirm
that, in spite of the negative connotations that emerge from the conventional
image of the Venezuelan judiciary, they still consider the courts as one of the
possible options for their clients, and also, the lawyers generally seem to be
satisfied with their experience with these fora.
Business lawyers seem to agree that the obstacles to physical access are
easily circumvented. Prominent lawyers go to courts only when their presence

202 Even though it is true that a number of years ago, it was very common for court employees
to go on strike very often; these kinds of protests have not occurred during the last five years,
but people still make comments about the "problem ofjudicial employees going on strike." See
Interview with Venezuelan business lawyer, partner at boutique litigation firm, in Caracas,
Venezuela (Oct. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Interview #40]. See also Paralizaci6nIndefinida de
Tribunales,EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.), July 27, 200 1, availableat http://buscador.eluniversal.co
m/2001/07/27/por art 27108CC.shtml; Eugenio Martinez, Tribunales Siguen en Huelga, EL
UNIVERSAL (Venez.), Aug. 2, 2001, availableat http://buscador.eluniversal.com/2001/08/02/
pol_art_02102AA.shtml.
203Naturally, I was not interested in the cases in which the parties are compelled to use the
courts, either because theyhave been brought as defendants or because the law requires ajudicial
ruling in order to recognize a legal status. My interest remained in the cases in which the
parties-or at least, one of them-voluntarily chose to use the courts.
204 See Interview with Venezuelan Business lawyer, Managing Partner at law firm, in Caracas,
Venezuela (Mar. 19, 2004); Interview with Venezuelan business lawyer, partner at law firm, in
Caracas, Venezuela (June 26, 2003); Interview with Venezuelan business lawyer, solo
practitioner, in Caracas, Venezuela (July 25, 2006).
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is absolutely necessary; the rest of the time, their paralegals are the ones who
attend the courts on a daily basis, and they do not need to stand in line and wait
long hours to check the status of their cases. Lawyers from mid-size and large
firms-the ones that usually represent business parties-have close
connections with court employees, some of whom are on their payroll.
Depending on the degree of trust and loyalty between the lawyer and the court
official, the former might not need to monitor the docket so closely, since the
inside contact would usually alert him or her when any event affecting the case
is about to occur. As one interviewee mentioned, "there is trust but to a certain
extent, and one has always the need to keep an eye on how these people work
because they might be also helping the counterpart.""0 5 Having the right
contacts is important, even contacts with the security guards at the gates of the
court building are beneficial as the guards will usually let their "friends" move
ahead in order to access the elevators or allow them to use the back doors to
enter the building.
Obviously, the connections that really matter are not the ones that allow
lawyers and their paralegals to have physical access to the court buildings.
The important incentive to use the courts rests on the connections that are
developed at higher levels-with the judges and their clerks. Most of the
lawyers interviewed agreed that even though the judicial system is said to be
widely unproductive, there are some "competent" judges who, in their view,
run very efficient courts. These are the judges with whom they have
developed a patron-client relationship, or who belong to an informal network
that overlaps with the network that exist among business lawyers. 0 6
Interestingly, the majority of the relationships between lawyers (private
actors) and judges (public officials) are not reciprocal,0 7 in the sense that only
one party (the public official) is expected to act upon the influence of the other
one (the private actor), whose main duty is to offer compensation (generally
a bribe) in exchange for a favor.20 ' Furthermore, most business lawyers in
205 See Interview with Venezuelan business lawyer, in litigation department of international
law firm, in Caracas, Venezuela (Jan. 31, 2005).
20 To a certain extent, this network overlap between private and public actors resembles the

"todai-yakkai-zaikai complex" described by Taira and Wada and reported by Granovetter. See
Granovetter, supra note 124, at 443.
207 For a description ofthe issue ofreciprocity in social networks settings, see Mitchell, supra
note 74, at 25.
208 This is the typical situation of an "action-set network," that is, one in which "the linkages
are used for the flow of goods and services rather than the flow of information." Id. at 38. One
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Venezuela do not consider themselves as being socially equal with judges,
even if they graduated from the same law school or have other interests in
common. 2°9 There is often a steep social gradient, a distance among them, but
the relationship still works efficiently, as each party clearly understands their
210
social differences and has no aspirations to join the other's social group.
When I asked the respondents about the special qualifications that these
judges might have, I quickly learned that the perception about their
competence was not based on their credentials or intellectual background.
Rather, it was based on how often they favorably decided cases in which those
lawyers had a vested interest. I will revisit this notion when explaining the
social networks that operate within the courts.
In sum, I learned that business disputants do not seem as averse to the
courts as conventional perception dictates. To a certain extent, they see courts
as efficient bodies and use them selectively, 21' but their allegiance to social
networks plays an important role in their court selection.

of the ways in which this occurs is throughpatronage,where "the support is bartered for some
specific promise: the resources had to be husbanded and awarded to influential people who
would" do something on behalf of the other party. See id.
209 For a description about stratification in social networks' settings, see Barnes, supra
note 7 1, at 44.
20 When analyzing the social construction of corruption, Granovetter describes an interesting
example portrayed by Larissa Lomnitz in a case study about corruption networks in Chile where,
like in Venezuela, "business was dominated by a socially-defined upper class and the
government bureaucracy by a middle-class." See Mark Granovetter, The Social Construction
of Corruption 5 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished article presented at the conference: The Norms,
Beliefs, and Institutions of Capitalism: Celebrating Weber's ProtestantEthic and The Spirit of
Capitalism, available at http://www.economyandsociety.org/events/Granovetter_paper.pdf)
(discussing Larissa Lomnitz, Reciprocity of Favors in The Urban Middle Class of Chile, in
STuDIEs IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY (George Dalton ed., 1971)). In trying to explain the
social interaction occurring in Chile, Lomnitz's study found that "The social distance between
business interests and bureaucracy facilitated graft as a form of well-understood market
exchange, in which bureaucrats willingly accepted cash or material payments in return for favors
to businessmen, since the social inferiority that this implied was already well understood." Id.
at2.
211 Le6n, supra note 182, at 412.
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B. Dispute Processing,Networks and the Courts: From the Tribes to the
JudicialRevolution of the Twenty-First Century
An average business disputant in Venezuela knows that the first step before
filing a lawsuit is to identify a well-connected lawyer, a friendly court, a
familiar judge, and of course, be open to gratify court employees for "being
diligent."2' 2 Judges regarded as friendly to the business community are usually
labeled by executives as "decent" and "competent," even if their diligence is
clearly tilted in favor of one side.2" 3
Also, business lawyers have traditionally been judged not only for "what
they know" (their particular legal skills) but more importantly, for "who they
know" (their social connections); as a result, legal professionals have become
brokers in the real sense.2 4 The stereotypical image of a network within the
Venezuelan legal environment is that of a group of lawyers with political
power and influence, who together with some judges and other public officials,
form close-knit and strong chains known as "judicial tribes" (tribus
2" 5 These networks became popular approximately fifty years ago,
judiciales).
portray an extreme form ofjudicial clientelism, and have largely influenced the
way in which the courts operate in Venezuela.2" 6
The origin of these judicial tribes can be traced back to the early 1960s,
when the national government took direct action to suppress the flourishing
leftists' guerrilla movements that were seen as a threat to the young

22 See Interview with Venezuelan business lawyer, in Caracas, Venezuela (June 21, 2003)

[hereinafter Interview #22]; Interview with Venezuelan business lawyer, solo practitioner, in
Caracas, Venezuela (July 22, 2006) [hereinafter Interview #65]; Interview with Venezuelan
business lawyer, Head ofLegal Department of Financial Institution, in Caracas, Venezuela (Mar.
22, 2004).
213 Granovetter has called "neutralization" the phenomenon by which an individual
"acknowledges the causal connection between a payment and a service, or that items have been
appropriated as the result of a position held, but implies thatgiven the particularcircumstances,
no moral violation has occurred." Granovetter, supra note 210, at 2 (emphasis in original).
214 "Brokerage" is another form of relationship that occurs in action-set networks when one
individual acts as a go-between between two networks, by bridging them together. RONALD S.
BURT, BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CAPITAL 10-13 (2005).
25 La Tribu de Carmen, ELUNIVERSAL(Venez.), Mar. 12,2006, availableathttp://buscador.

eluniversal.com/2006/03/12/polapo_ 12190F.shtml; RespuestasaAcusacionesy OtrosDetalles
de Sus Planes, EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.), Feb. 24, 2005, availableat http://buscador.eluniversal.
com/2005/02/24/pol apo_24106B.shtml.
216 Respuestas a Acusacionesy Otros Detalles de Sus Planes, supra note 215.
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Venezuelan democracy.2" 7 The government's reaction to the growing activity
of these rebel groups was to prosecute them in military courts, as these fora
were easily controlled by the executive. 218 However, as some cases had to be
tried in ordinary criminal courts, the executive decided to expand its sphere of
influence and moved in order to expand its political control over those courts
as well.2 19
Prominent political leaders who were also lawyers, and therefore familiar
with the court system, were entrusted with the task of assuring governmental
control over the judiciary. 20 David Morales Bello, a well-known lawyer and
politician, became widely recognized for his vast control over a number of
judges and for leading the first clan-like group that would later be known as
David's Tribe (la tribu de David).22' Another famous tribe that controlled a
large portion of the courts was the Borsalino Clan, which was named for a type
of hat worn by one of its key leaders.2 2
Even though the purpose of the government controlling the judiciary was
apparently limited to assuring institutional stability and preventing the leftist
movements from spreading over the country, politicians rapidly saw it as a
window of opportunity to expand their influence, and the main political parties
became increasingly involved in exerting influence on how judges were
appointed and how the judiciary worked. 223 Before many people even realized
it, the leading political parties literally divided the country into areas of
influence, each retaining control over a certain number of jurisdictions or

217 Prez-Perdomo, supranote 188.
218

Id.

219

Id.
Id.

220

221CORONL, supra note 130, at 342-43; Prez-Perdomo, supra note 188. See Rodolfo
Baptista, Puchi: El CNE No Peude Ceder a Presionesde la Tribu de David, EL UNIVERSAL
(Venez.), Dec. 1, 1998, availableat http://buscador.eluniversal.com/1998/12/01/pol-art-01II
6GG.shtmi.
222The presence of a leader shows that these "tribes" are slightly different from most social
networks in the traditional sense. Networks do not usually have a head or a hierarchically
superior authority; and the decisionmaking process within them occurs as a result of a consensus
among the participants in the absence of a centralized entity. However, the Venezuelan judicial
tribes have a clear leader who is considered the central figure and who is also regarded as
hierarchically superior in relationship with the other members, and as such, is in charge of
coordinating the activities of the network.
223 See P~rez-Perdomo, supra note 188.
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courts.224 This became more evident, and to a certain extent "institutionalized"
after 1969 when the Judicial Council was created.225 Early on, the Council
became controlled by members of the political party who had the majority of
seats in Congress and in the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court,
which obviously gave it a large amount of leverage.226 For years to come, the
judiciary was populated by judges chosen more because of their political
allegiance than their legal competence or merits.227
The process of appointing judges was one of intense negotiations among
political actors.228 It was an unwritten rule that those who wanted to enter into
the judiciary needed a political sponsor (padrino), which produced a
relationship of subordination between the candidate and his or her supporter
in the case the first got appointed. 229 Among the usual backers there were
influential politicians, some of whom were connected with lawyers who in turn
were key members of the judicialtribes.2 3 ' Leaders of the business community
were, to a certain extent, members of these networks of power, which
translated into clear benefits for them.23 j
The tribes were clan-like structures led by private lawyers who had been
involved in politics or were fundraisers for political campaigns and therefore
had connections with important political parties or the government. Some
tribes were actually led by retired judges who after leaving the bench decided
23 2
to go back to private practice and to keep their influence upon some courts.
Some groups had spheres of influence in particular areas (e.g., criminal courts)
or levels (e.g., trial courts, Superior Courts, or the Supreme Court itself) while
others were known for having control over a certain jurisdiction. 3

224

Id.

Id.
Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 As a result, the judicial career became a sort of social network in itself, reserved to those
225
226

bound by common political affiliations, and the need for a sponsor became an entry-barrier as
typically occurs in close-knit networks. See Werner Raub & Jeroen Weesie, Reputation and
Efficiency in SocialInteractions:An Example ofNetworkEffects, 96 AM. J. SOCIOL. 626,626-54
(1990).
230 See Baptista, supra note 22 1.
231 Id.
232 Pdrez-Perdomo, supra note 188.
233 See Interview with former Venezuelan Judge, in Caracas, Venezuela (June 24, 2003)
[hereinafter Interview #25]; Interview with former Venezuelan Prosecutor, in Caracas,
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Active judges, public defenders, and prosecutors were also part of the
tribes.234 Even though these groups worked informally and very cautiously,
their involvement in notorious cases and subsequent scandals during the early
1990s led to wide media coverage about their existence, structure, and
membership.23 5
The main purpose of these networks was to manipulate the courts in order
to get favorable decisions for their clients, to speed the handling of judicial
processes, or to simply counteract the negative influence of another clan
favoring the other side.2 36 Each of these tribes had a law firm as a facade.237
The firm would offer its clients the guarantee of a speedy trial, with a
favorable decision, and would often assure clients of positive results on
possible appeals and even, if necessary, at the Supreme Court level. 23" The
lawyers of the firm would usually set their fees very high since they had to
include the "work" of others.239
The firm also served as a hub to all members of the network, and a small
group of lawyers (brokers) centralized the communication with judges, clerks,
and other public officials.24 ° Some active judges were permanently tied to
particular tribes, while others were known to freelance by collaborating with
several different groups on a case-by-case basis. 24' Business lawyers were also
part of these webs, and although many of them maintained a very low
profile,242 their reputation as effective professionals largely depended on how
close they were to the heart of the network. 243 Lawyers not only used the
networks to process cases in courts, but also to get help bypassing regulatory

Venezuela (Oct. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Interview #44].
234 See P6rez-Perdomo, supra note 188; Baptista, supra note 221.
235 Pdrez-Perdomo, supra note 188.
236 See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
237 See Interview #25, supranote 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
238 See Interview #25, supranote 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
239 See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
241 See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
241See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
242 See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supranote 233. Socially, it was seen
as undesirable for upper-class lawyers and business executives to be seen interacting with lowclass court officials, so the former tended to act in a covert manner or through intermediaries.
243 See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supra note 233. In other terms,
depending on their social distance to the ego (individual regarded as the center of the network).
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processes, dealing with government authorities, and negotiating disputes
outside the formal system.2"
The mid-1990s witnessed a crisis among the traditional political parties
who lost legitimacy and therefore their traditional power and influence within
the political arena.245 After the two failed coups d'etat of 1992, the
Venezuelan political elite became increasingly fragile, which also affected
their spheres of influence on the judiciary.246 About the same time, high
profile corruption cases involving judicial networks were denounced by the
media,247 which made the judicial tribes weaker and eventually led to their
demise. 24' The pacts according to which the leading political parties had
shared their control over the courts slowly eroded; remaining members were
left on their own. 249 A number of retired judges who had amassed some power
during the previous years became leaders of their own small-scale corruption
rings, thus becoming judicial entrepreneurs of a sort. 25 ° These judges were
only capable of cutting deals involving cases being tried in their own former
courts or in others in which they still had connections.2"' The network based
system became less efficient due to the fact that participants were only tied by
one dimensional, single stranded, and relatively weak relationships.
As opposed to what occurred during the climax of the judicial tribes' time,
the facade of these new groups were not law firms but the individual judges
themselves, or their clerks.2 52 The situation became more complicated for
business disputants and their lawyers who were now forced to establish new
connections.2 53 These difficulties did not last for long.25 4

24 See Interview #25, supranote 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
245 See Interview #25, supranote 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
24 Nrez-Perdomo, supra note 188, at 15.
247

Id.

248 Id. In spite of the tribes' notorious influence and power, most of their members were tied

only through uniplex relationships, and once these relationships were affected or one of the most
salient members (the leader) was disabled the entire network suffered.
240 See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
250 This system resembles the Japanese example of "amakudari" (descent from heaven)
described by Granovetter to depict "the movement of retired government officials to positions
in industry from which they activate their social networks in the state bureaucracy to help
coordinate state-business interactions." Granovetter, supra note 124, at 443.
251 See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
252 See Interview #25, supra note 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
253 See Interview #25, supranote 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
254 See Interview #25, supranote 233; Interview #44, supra note 233.
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With the advent of the "Bolivarian Revolution" that started in 1998, the
existing political structures suffered an important change.255 New President
Hugo Chdvez, a leader of the first 1992 coup attempt, vowed to undertake a
complete overhaul of the state institutions plus a deep legal reform process,
including the drafting of a new Constitution.25 6 As part of this process, a
Judicial Emergency decree was issued in 1999 with the general purpose of
cleaning up the judicial system. 57 This emergency legislation vested Congress
with ample powers to restructure the judiciary through the power of removal
and appointment ofjudges, the ability to make decisions on the judicial budget,
to control all
to create a Commission for Judicial Reform, and in25general,
8
matters related to the functioning of the court system.
One of the first actions taken by the Emergency Commission was the
dismissal or suspension of a large number of judges under charges of
corruption or unjustified delay in deciding the cases brought before them.25 9
During the following months of the same year, 340 judges were summarily
dismissed.26 °
From the outset, it was simple to realize that these actions were mainly
motivated by political retaliation against the traditional political establishment
and not by an altruistic interest to remove corrupt judges and to improve the
system. 26 I As a clear signal of this, many of the dismissed judges were
replaced by militants of President Chdivez's political party, and to guarantee
their unconditional loyalty to the regime, their appointment was temporary so
they could be easily dismissed when necessary. 62 By 2001, these
appointments accounted for more than 80% of the total number of judges.263
Traditional judicial cartels did in fact disappear, but, ironically, the new
structure created a breeding ground for an even more politicized judiciary in
which not only a group, but all judges, are expected to pay unconditional

255 See Pdrez-Perdomo, supra note 188, at 23.
256

Id.

257

Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2000, at 150 (1999), availableat

http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/americas-09.htm.
258 See Pdrez-Perdomo, supra note 188.
259 Id.
260 Id. This number represents about a third of the total number of existing judges by that
time. See id.
261 See id.
262

Id.

263

Id.
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loyalty and to be aligned with the official party or face summary dismissal.2"
This seems to be the true face of the "judicial revolution" in Venezuela.265
Almost six years after the judicial emergency was declared, Venezuela now
has an overtly politicized judiciary in which new cartels and close-knit groups
have emerged under the shadow of the president's political project.266 The big
difference now is that only those who have connections within the ruling
political party can take advantage of the influential cartels that have permeated
the courts.267 The system is more loyalty-based than in the past, and business
disputants are still able to find their way around. 68
As discussed in the previous part, the Venezuelan private sector evolved in
an environment in which the government was a prominent player. 269 As a
result, even the most ordinary actors learned to deal with political influence at
all levels.270 Some have criticized these patterns of behavior as colliding with
271
the ideals of democracy, free competition, equality, and economic freedom,
and whereas this might be true, it is also certain that many people-and
particularly those from the business sector-have benefited from this
circumstance. 272 In the recent years, the country has certainly experienced

264 See Prez-Perdomo, supra note 188 (describing the tactics used by the Venezuelan
government to dismiss judges without cause).
265 Very often, representatives from the government refer to the restructuring of the court
system as the "judicial revolution,"just to be consistent with the label that President ChAvez uses
for his regime, which he usually refers to as the Bolivarian Revolution (la revoluci6n
Bolivariana). RICHARD GOTT,HUGO CHAVEZ AND THE BOLUVARIAN REVOLUTION (2005); Jeffrey
Cedeno, Venezuela in the Twenty-First Century: 'New Men, New Ideals, New Procedures,' 15
J.LATIN AM. CULTURAL STUD. 93 (2006).
266 See Pdrez-Perdomo, supra note 188.
267 During the summer of 2006, a large-scale corruption scandal caught the attention of the

local media in Venezuela. A group of lawyers and judges are believed to be linked to corruption
scandals, for rendering favorable decisions to criminal networks and extorting citizens. This
group has been labeled as la banda de los enanos (the band of the dwarfs) and is said to be
formed of at least fifteen judges in Caracas and 400 nationwide, and it is believed to have
adopted a similar structure to the judicial tribes of the 1970s and 1980s. See Fiscal General:
"Queremos ahondaren las denunciassobrela Bandade los Enanos," EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.),
June 29, 2006, availableat http://buscador.eluniversal.com/2006/06/29/polava_29A735095.
shtml.
268 See Pdrez-Perdomo, supranote 188.
269 See Jatar, supra note 24.
270

Id.

271 Id. at

98.
See Interview #22, supra note 212; Interview with Venezuelan in-house counsel, in
Caracas, Venezuela (Mar. 24, 2004); Interview with Venezuelan business buyer, Partner at
272
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many changes as a result of the "Bolivarian Revolution," and to a certain
extent, this has reshaped many of the traditional structures that were in
place.273 While Venezuela's population has grown in the past forty years,274
its society continues to work under the same basic social norms, particularly
the heavy reliance on networks. More than ever, the "know-who" (having the
right connections) makes a big difference in allowing people to be successful
in many activities, including the processing of legal disputes.
It is true that the traditional networks and the so-called judicial tribes are
long gone, but it is also true that new groups with a similar structure have
emerged.27 5 Over the years in which I conducted the field research for this
investigation, I found it interesting to witness how business disputants have
adapted to the changes and how they have positioned themselves successfully
in light of the current conditions. When I first interviewed people about these
issues at the dawn of the political transition (2001 and 2002), many seemed to
be worried about the political changes that were underway and expected to
face numerous difficulties. It was not uncommon to hear lawyers complain
about having lost their contacts in certain courts and to comment on how
difficult it had become to litigate in an environment that, in their view, offered
no room for predictability.
To them, uncertainty meant having to use the courts without the help of
their social connections. Their ideal scenario was one in which they could still
rely on their contacts to manipulate the system. This obviously seems like a
contradiction, when we realize that the quest for institutional reform has been
geared precisely to eradicate the predominant role of corrupt networks and to
replace them with transparent and neutral institutions.
During many of the follow-up interviews that I conducted in the years from
2003 to 2006, it was interesting to observe how some of the people who were
initially hopeless, had found their way around the system. "It was a matter of
time, ' one prominent lawyer declared, making clear reference to the process

international firm, in Caracas, Venezuela (June 25, 2004)]; Interview with Venezuelan executive
with law degree, in Caracas, Venezuela (July 20, 2006).
273 See Gorr,supra note 265; Cedeno, supra note 265, at 94.
274 Jeffrey Kentor, The Long Term Effects of Globalizationon Income Inequality,Population
Growth, and Economic Development, 48 Soc. PROBLEMS 435, 435 (2001).
27 See La Tribu de Carmen, supra note 215.
276 See Interview #22, supranote 212; Interview #65, supranote 212; Interview with business
executive and experienced lawyer, in Caracas, Venezuela (Jan. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Interview

#45].
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of getting accustomed to working with the new networks, establishing new ties
and reconnecting old ones. Whenever we asked about how the situation is
different compared to the old way of dealing, I was told that:
we are the same people, governments may change and some other
things will vary, but the people are still the same; so after all,
things are working in a similar way to that in the past. Of course,
the players are in different positions but we are all the same...
it is, if I may say, the Venezuelan way of dealing with things.277
The speaker concluded with a common Venezuelan saying that goes: "God
may squeeze but never chokes (Dios aprietapero no ahorca)."
While it is true that judicial tribes and other forms of corruption networks
have existed and played a salient role in Venezuela, it cannot be said that every
single dispute has to go through a network in order to be decided. Ordinary
citizens can certainly use the courts without needing to use connections, "but
' and certainly,
knowing which specific key to play makes things a lot easier, 278
in the business community that seems to be the right way to proceed.
VI. THANKS BUT No THANKS: THE MODEST ACCEPTANCE OF
ADR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS IN VENEZUELA
This Part illustrates how the members of the Venezuelan business sector
have continued to use mediation within their social networks' environments,
even after the institutionalization of ADR processes in Venezuela.
In order to justify their formulas, reform advocates have stressed that the
implementation of ADR mechanisms was a necessity given the chaotic
condition of the court system and the need to provide disputants with modem
and efficient processes.279 As a result, enormous resources were spent on the
promotion of institutionalized arbitration and mediation, but business
disputants continued to address their grievances in the informal way with

277 Interview #22, supra note 212; see also Interview #45, supra note 276; Interview #65,

supranote 212.
278 Interview #22, supra note 212; see also Interview #45, supra note 276; Interview #65,
supranote 212.
279

Iglesias, supra note 64.
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which they were familiar. 28" This Part contains a further elaboration of a
previous research project through which I explored why business lawyers stay
away from the newly created arbitration and mediation centers and instead use
informal processes. 211
A. ADR andJudicialReform Agendas: Shooting First...
Court-connected ADR has been promoted in the United States mainly as a
way for speeding civil case resolution and reducing litigations costs. 282 Its
perceived attribute as a docket-clearing device 283 made ADR attractive not only
to American judges, but also to multinational organizations and foreign
governments, who during the mid-i 980s began including judicially-sponsored
ADR in their plans to revamp courts and achieve structural changes to public
institutions.284 Soon, the implementation of ADR mechanisms became one of
the key elements of both domestic and internationally-sponsored judicial
reform agendas throughout Latin America.285
Reform advocates from elsewhere, however, did not realize that courtconnected ADR was devised in the United States for fine-tuning the judiciary
and not for rethinking it.286 Also, they did not take into consideration that the
success of court-connected ADR in the United States was more a desire than
a proven fact.28 7

See G6mez, supra note 156.
ld.
282 Hensler, supra note 191; see also Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the
280
281

Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L.
REv. 165, 185 (2003).
203 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. DisP. REs. 19 (1999).
204 HARRY BLAIR & GARY HANSEN, WEIGHING IN ON THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 14, 19 (1994).
25 Burki, supra note 61.
26 Deborah R. Hensler, Senior Fellow, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Remarks at World Bank
Alternate Dispute Resolution Workshop: Empirical Research on ADR Programs 44 (Jan. 6,
2000) (transcript available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resourc
es/TranscriptOfWorkshop.pdf).
287 Hensler, supra note 282, at 178, 194, 195.
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Based on the perception that alternative mechanisms are widely used by
disputants in affluent and developed societies"-namely the United
States-because of their potential for offering an efficient way to handle
disputes, reform advocates at different levels have proposed them as a way to
achieve a wide array of objectives. These include facilitating access to justice
and helping decongest the courts, encouraging foreign investment, and thus,
aiding in the achievement of economic development.28 9
Reform advocates in Latin America have stressed that the true demand for
alternative mechanisms at the domestic level is high, but the lack of a modem
legal framework has acted as a barrier,29 ° thus confining disputants to conform
themselves with the allegedly malfunctioning courts. This had led to the belief
that the implementation of modern ADR legislation, the investment of
resources in training, and the sponsorship of institutional providers can
contribute to meeting such needs.29 1
Following this idea, both the Venezuelan government and the private sector
embarked on a crusade to advocate the promotion of ADR mechanisms, also
believing that it would help decongest the ill-functioning courts, in addition to
allowing citizens to address their legal disputes in an expeditious, inexpensive,
and efficient manner.292 This, advocates believe, is the trend in modern nations
where ADR mechanisms have become very popular and have also proved to
be efficient tools for solving many problems related to the administration of
justice.2 93
Strong governmental support for ADR became evident with the passage of
several laws providing for the use of mediation and arbitration in different
areas such as labor, consumer rights, insurance, and family law.294 As a

288 This approach is what I called the "Structural Paradigm," and as explained earlier, it

reaffirms the apparent dichotomy of modern/primitive societies so frequently depicted in studies
about the functioning of legal institutions. See supra Part III.
289 Iglesias, supra note 64.
29' Adriana Polania, Los ADR en Latinoamrica (Oct. 26, 2000) (unpublished article
presented at the conference: Commercial ADR in the XXI Century).
291 Le6n, supra note 182, at 414-17.
292 Manuel A. G6mez, Assessing ADR Providers in Latin America: Venezuela's Business
Center for Conciliation and Arbitration (CEDCA) (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
293 Business Center for Conciliation and Arbitration, Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration,
http://www.cedca.org.ve/cedca-ingles/rules.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
294 See G6mez, supra note 156.
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In 1998, the Commercial Arbitration Act (CAA) was passed.296 Shortly
thereafter, the two main chambers of commerce sponsored private arbitration
centers.297 In addition, conferences and other academic events that focused on
the perceived advantages of alternative mechanisms were organized, law
schools began including ADR-related courses in their curricula, and several
private institutions began offering workshops to inform lawyers and citizens
in general about the benefits of these alternative mechanisms.298 By 2000, an
extensive ADR machinery was already in place and its supporters claimed that
the users of the legal system would embrace this panacea almost overnight.2 99
B. ADR and the PrivateSector
As also happened in most other countries with institutional reform plans,
the Venezuelan business sector became the focus of special attention, mainly
because of the idea among reform advocates that promoting ADR would help
foster legal certainty and confidence in institutions. 0 0 Judicial reform
advocates believed that a stable institutional environment would attract foreign
investors to the region, who otherwise, would not conduct business in
countries with such weak legal systems.30 ' An increase in the amount of
foreign investments would, in turn, help the country to achieve its desired
economic development. 0 2
295 Article 258 of the Venezuelan Constitution establishes that: "The law will promote

arbitration, conciliation, mediation and any other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms."
CONST1TUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVIARIANA DE VENEZUELA [ConstitutionoftheBoliviarian
Republic of Venezuela] art. 258 (Venez.).
296 Ley de Arbitraje Comercial [CommercialArbitrationAct] (1998) (Venez.).
297 See G6mez, supra note 292, at 8.
298

Id.

299Mariela Leon, Centro de Arbitraje ComercialInicia Sus Operaciones, EL UNIVERSAL

(Venez.), Mar. 12, 2006, available at http://noticias.eluniversal.com/2001/03/12/12202CC.
shtml.
0 See Polania, supra note 290.
301See Amanda Perry, Effective Legal Systems and ForeignDirectInvestment: In Search of
the Evidence, 49 INT'L &COMP. L.Q. 779, 781 (2000).
302 Amartya Sen, What Is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the Development Process?
(June 5, 2000) (unpublished article presented at the World Bank Conference on Comprehensive
Legal and Judicial Development, available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/
legalandjudicail.pdf); but see Beatrice Weder, Legal Systems and Economic Performance:The
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Today, a common idea3 3 is that ADR and, particularly, mediation are
among the most preferred methods for business disputants." ° The perception
is that these mechanisms not only allow the parties to gain control over both
the process and the outcome, 30 5 but are also cheaper and faster than ordinary
litigation, 3 6 even though there is no robust empirical evidence to support such
assertions.30 7 Conversely, executives are believed to dislike litigation because
of the perceived risks and uncertainty generally associated with it.30 8 But the
notions of arbitration and mediation are by no means new to members of the
business sector.
In the United States, for example, business disputants were familiar with
binding arbitration long before ADR became a fashionable idea.30 9
Businesspeople used arbitration to process their grievances in a way that
"assured that their shared customs, however idiosyncratic, would be
respected.',3 Decisions were made by a third party, usually selected from
among members of the community, and these decisions were often based on

EmpiricalEvidence, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 21 (Waleed

Malik et al. eds., 1995); Burki, supra note 61, at 21-26 (maintaining that "there is no clear
evidence of the economic costs of weak legal systems [since] research conducted on the
economic costs of a badly working legal system is mostly anecdotal or in the form of individual
case studies").
303Hensler, supra note 41, at 81, 83.
" However, as Hensler points out, "[b]ecause there are no comprehensive statistics on cases
that use alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the private sector, the relative popularity
of arbitration and mediation is currently unknown." Hensler, supra note 282, at 183 n.76.
Notwithstanding, some studies have reported an increasing use of ADR for business disputes.
See DELOrrrE & TOUCHE, LITIGATIONS SERVICES DvisION 1993 SURVEY OF GENERAL AND

OUTSIDE COUNSELS: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (summarizing the results of a survey
among the Fortune 1,000 corporations and showing that 68% favored the use of mediation);
David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patternsof ADR Use in CorporateDisputes, 54 DIsP.
RESOL. J. 66 (1999) (concluding that the shift from traditional litigation toward the use of ADR
is one of the foremost important trends in corporate America in the 1990s). Eighty-seven percent
of the surveyed population reported having used mediation and 80% reported having used
arbitration at least once in the past three years. Id.
30 David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Top General Counsels Support ADR, 8 BUS. L.
TODAY 24 (1999).
306 Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 304, at 66.
'o7Hensler, supra note 282, at 178. See also Hensler, supra note 41.
30 Lipsky & Seeber, supranote 305. But see John Lande, Failingthe Faith in Litigation?
A Survey of Business Lawyers'andExecutives' Opinions, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 69 (1998).
309 Hensler, supra note 282, at 181.
310 AUERBACH, supra note 21, at 102.
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special business norms rather than official state law."' A similar phenomenon
has occurred in other western societies.1 2
Almost a hundred years ago, due to sustained pressure from the American
business community, arbitration became formally accepted within the legal
system. 3 The first steps were taken by the New York Chamber of Commerce
and the New York Bar Association, resulting in the passage of the first
arbitration act in the United States. 3 4 The federal government quickly
followed this movement and enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, 315
which is still in force.31 6
Over the years, the popularity of arbitration has provoked the creation of
several provider organizations, and motivated professionals from different
disciplines to specialize their knowledge and offer their services as neutral
arbitrators on a permanent basis.31 7 With the increased popularity of
alternative mechanisms and the growing interest in negotiation and problem
solving skills during recent years, many of the organizations have expanded
their activities to include mediation and other similar models. 8
In the particular case of Venezuela, legislation that expressly allowed the
use of conciliation and arbitration for civil and commercial disputes can be
traced as far back as 1830.319 As initially regulated in the Code of Civil

"' Stephen J. Ware, ArbitrationandAssimilation,77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1053, 1058(2000). The
fact that the arbitrators were also members of the community ensured that their determinations
were in line with social norms with which the arbitrators were familiar. In addition, the
enforcement of the arbitrators' decisions were supported by informal controls that only work
well in close-knit communities (e.g., threats of exclusion, ostracism, or other forms of social
retaliation against those who violate community norms). Id.
32 Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering,104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2334-35 (2004).
313 AUERBACH, supranote 21, at 102-05.
314 KATHERINE

V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION 311 (2000) ("In 1919, the New York Chamber of Commerce joined with the New

York Bar Association to draft a Statute for the New York legislature changing the common law
rule. The statute, drafted by Julius Cohen, was patterned on the English arbitration law of
1898.").
35 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
316 STONE, supra note 314, at 312-13.
...See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org (last visited Mar. 13,
2008); JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
318 Hensler, supra note 282, at 183.
319 CONSTITUCIONDELESTADODE VENEZUELA [Constitutionof the Venezuelan State] art. 190
(1830) (Venez.) ("The Venezuelans are free to solve their differences through arbitration, even
if the trial has been initiated."). In the case of mediation (conciliation) it was originally regulated
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Procedure, arbitration and mediation were formally appended to the judicial
process, which allowed for extensive judicial control to take place.32 ° In
general, the law provided that the arbitrators could be appointed by the judges,
had to decide following legal rules and their awards could be reviewed by the
courts in numerous circumstances. 32 ' This led arbitration to be perceived by
some as a very impractical process and gave rise to frequent criticism.322
The 1998 CAA, which is modeled after the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) guidelines, addressed and overcame the
apparent obstacles imposed by the Code of Civil Procedure.32 3 Among its
innovations, the CAA expressly recognized the importance of providing
organizations whose main role was to administer arbitration and mediation
procedures, to devise and apply standards and to maintain a roster of neutrals
to serve the business community.324
Some ADR centers were already in place before the passing of the CAA,
but had no activity until after this legislation entered into effect. 325 The CAA
triggered the interest of chambers of commerce in sponsoring institutional
providers, two of which began to operate in Caracas: the Business Center for
Conciliation and Arbitration (CEDCA) sponsored by the VenezuelanAmerican Chamber of Commerce (VENAMCHAM),32 6 and the Arbitration
Center of the Caracas Chamber of Commerce (CACCC). 327 The other ADR
center, the Arbitration Center of the Maracaibo's Chamber of Commerce
(CCM), opened its doors in the city of Maracaibo, one of the most important
business hubs in the country.32
in the Venezuelan Code of Civil Procedure of 1836. Codigo de Procedimiento Judicial [Code
of Civil Procedure] arts. 12-13 (1836) (Venez.). In other Latin American countries, the
experience is similar.
320 See G6mez, supra note 156.
321 Id. at 21.
322 Id. at 33.
323 Id. at 45.
324 Ley de Arbitraje Comercial [CommercialArbitrationAct] arts. 11-14 (1998) (Venez.).
32 Interview with Luis Cova Arria, Cova Arria & Asociados, in Caracas, Venezuela (Aug. 2,
2001); Interview with Diana Droulers, Director Arbitration Center of the Caracas Chamber of
Commerce, in Caracas, Venezuela (Aug. 3, 2001).
326 See CEDCA, http://www.cedca.org.ve/cedca-ingles/red-cost.htm (last visited Mar. 13,
2008).
327 The CACCC started its activities in 1998, and the first case was decided on that same year.
See Centro de Arbitraje, http://www.arbitrajeccc.org (follow "Quidnes Somos" hyperlink to
"Misi6n Vision") (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
328 CONAPRI, LAS CIUDADESMASATRACTIVASPARAINvERTIR75 (2005), availableat http://
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All three centers have more or less the same structure and are similarly
sponsored by business associations (chambers of commerce), which not only
provide financial support but also facilities and necessary equipment.3 29 All
centers offer both arbitration and mediation (conciliation) services, but they all
appear to be more focused on the former. CEDCA and CACCC have adopted
procedural rules and ethical standards for mediators and arbitrators. 330 Each
center also has permanent staff members, and a budget to operate and maintain
a permanent roster of neutrals.3
Many lawyers appear in the list of both centers, which is regarded as
prestigious within the business community. 332 Inclusion in the arbitrator's list
seems to be driven more by the idea of social contacts than by the candidate's
skills or previous experience with ADR.333 One might think that the fact that
most, if not all, roster members are currently practicing attorneys instead of
full-time neutrals would create conflicts of interest in the relatively small
Venezuelan business community; nonetheless, it is instead viewed as an
advantage,334 as the connections and social status of the arbitrators within the
lawyers' community are precisely what makes them valuable in the eyes of
local businesspeople 35

www.conapri.org/download/Ciudades.pdf.
329 See G6mez, supra note 292.
330 Id.
331 Id
332 See Interview with business lawyer, Partner at International Law Firm, in Caracas,
Venezuela (June 19, 2003) [hereinafter Interview #21]; Interview with business lawyer, in
Caracas, Venezuela (June 22,2003) [hereinafter Interview #23]; Interview #44, supranote 233;
Interview #40, supra note 202.
333 According to CEDCA's rules, for instance, in order to be included in the list of neutrals,
the aspirants have to be "invited" by the Board to submit a written request accompanied by two
references, and his or her resume. See CEDCA, Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, ch. 1,
arts. 3.2-3.3, availableat http://www.cedca.org.ve/cedca-ingles/rules.htm (last visited Mar. 13,
2008). It is expressly indicated that the Board will take into consideration "their reputation,
experience, interest and availability to serve." Id. art. 3.2. The rules also indicate that an
"application may be rejected even though [the candidate] enjoy[s] a recognized professional
career," which gives certain leeway to reject those who are not members of the network. Id.
art. 3.3(a).
134 See CEDCA, Forwardto the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, available at http://
www.cedca.org.ve/cedca-ingles/code.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
335 See G6mez, supranote 164.
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In general terms, these private centers are viewed as positive within the
business community.336 Most ofthe interviewees agreed that both CEDCA and
CACCC were well regarded, and are widely supported. However, very few
people actually use their services as can be seen in the following table that
shows the usage rate (decided arbitration cases) for the three main centers
during the years of 2001-2005:
USE OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONALIZED

ADR IN VENEZUELA (2001-2005)...
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Even though the actual number of business disputes that could go to
arbitration or mediation in the first place is not known, it is fair to say that
private ADR institutions handle very few cases. Actual usage is not even
consistent with the estimate of the centers' representatives, who initially
predicted that in the beginning, ADR institutions would resolve 85% of the

See Interview with business lawyer, head of Litigation Practice, in Caracas, Venezuela
(June 18, 2003); Interview #21, supra note 332; Interview #23, supranote 332; Interview #40,
supra note 202; Interview #44, supra note 233.
...See CACCC, http://www.arbitrajeccc.org/infogeneral.html (last visited June 20, 2006),
The table reproduced above is no longer available online and is on file with the author. For
similar data see Nfimero de Casos: CACC 1998-2007, http://www.arbitrajeccc.org/editor/deta
iltemplate.asp?item id=l 59 (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
336
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controversies among corporate parties, and also that disputants would widely
use the centers in order to avoid the corrupt, slow and costly courts.33
C. Thanks, But No Thanks
Notwithstanding the enormous efforts and resources invested, and the
apparent positive image that ADR centers have among members of the
business community, these institutions have not been truly embraced by its
potential beneficiaries.3 3 9 Instead, disputants continue to prefer processing
their conflicts in the same traditional ways that have always been available to
them, and, consequently, the new ADR centers are still among the least used
paths.34 °
With very few exceptions, the executives and corporate lawyers
interviewed had a positive image of mediation and arbitration, and were
generally in favor of its promotion. Indeed, the private sector has offered
" ' At the time
financial and institutional support to the new arbitration centers.34
of the interviews, many business executives-mainly from multinational
corporations-were also familiar with ADR processes and had been trained in
negotiation and problem solving techniques. Business lawyers, on the other
hand, were not only acquainted with the legal framework of arbitration and
mediation but in many cases had attended ADR workshops and were
knowledgeable about the leading literature in the field. Interestingly, they also
reported using mediation very often.
However, the mediation that most of these lawyers and executives employ
is not the one offered by the ADR centers in an institutionalized form. The
mediation they reported using often takes place after golf or tennis matches at
the local country club, during dinner parties, weddings and other social
engagements. Prominent lawyers whom both parties respect and know well
tend to act as neutrals.342 These lawyers are practicing attorneys from the

...See Leon, supra note 299.
...See G6mez, supra note 164, at 6.
" This is not difficult to foresee given the distinctive features of the Venezuelan society in
general, and the business sector in particular, where it is very common for participants to be
mutually bound by multiplex relationships and to be part of a relatively dense social network.
341 See G6mez, supra note 156.
342 The fact that these mediators are members of the same community to which the parties
belong, and therefore have a correspondingrelationshipwith them, is what determines their
greater intervention (process and decision control). In addition, they are chosen to intervene as
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leading law firms, and as such, also belong to networks that give them access
to certain spheres of influence within the business sector. Their names are
always included in the rosters of the ADR centers, but interestingly, it is not
through these institutions that they get referrals.
Even though businesspeople have shown support to the new ADR providing
institutions, it seems obvious that they have little incentive to use their
services.34 3 As one business lawyer told us:
Why would I recommend my clients to use CEDCA and pay an
expensive administrative fee if I can simply reach the same
arbitrators or mediators through another way? I have known most
of these guys (arbitrators) since law school days, we are members
of the same social clubs, our kids go to the same schools and
even our firms are relatively close to each other; I can just call
them anytime and sort things out without the hassle and the cost
of going through the centers. 3"
This opinion seemed to be shared by several others who operate in the same
social circles.

third parties to a dispute because of their perceived higher social status, but more importantly,
because others have trust in them. For a detailed study about trust and its effect on social
structures, see KAREN S. COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST? 2 (2005). However, the
trade-off is that these mediators are not really neutral in the sense that, as members of the same
community, they are subject to its social norms and may also have an interest that collides with
one (or both) of the parties. Most of the interviewees seemed to acknowledge this tension and
generally considered it to be outweighed by the fact that disputes were dealt with within the
community "among people like them." See Interview #45, supra note 276.
"' The scant use ofvoluntary ADR processes has also been explored by Merry & Silbey, who
in turn suggested that, in general:
citizens do not use alternatives voluntarily to the extent hoped for by
proponents of ADRMs because by the time a conflict is serious enough to
warrant an outsider's intervention, disputants do not want what alternatives
have to offer ( . .) At this point they conceptualize their problem as a
principled grievance for which they seek an authoritative and binding
solution, not as a conflict of interest in which they have limited and
negotiable goals.
Merry & Silbey, supra note 60, at 154.
3" Interview with Venezuelan business lawyer, litigation department in international law
firm, in Caracas, Venezuela (Jan. 31, 2005).
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As previously explained, the Venezuelan business sector is a relatively
small and cohesive community in which many members know each other and
are bound together by multiplex relationships. Aside from the typical
economic or business interests that characterize the links that exist between
members of this community, many of these members are also tied together by
kinship, or lifelong friendships. As a result, when disputes arise among
community members who are bound by multiplex, and permanent social ties,
the parties prefer to use processes that not only help them to resolve the issue
at hand, but that also contribute to preserve their social bonds and have the
least negative impact on their environment. Intra-group conciliatory
mechanisms (non-institutionalized mediation) fit easily into that category.
Mediation seems to be a preferred mechanism among business disputants
in Venezuela, but only when it is used in an environment that preserves the
participants' social values and their identity as a group.345 This is only possible
when done within the realm of their social networks, and therefore, outside the
formal institutions (ADR centers).3 46
ADR centers were originally promoted by reform advocates with the idea
of offering efficient alternatives to the courts, which in their view were
unattractive to business disputants.3 47 The vision was to make institutionalized
ADR processes available to the entire business community, but they failed to
take into account that these centers would not fulfill any need.348 As
previously described, business lawyers and their clients are already satisfied
with the traditional way of processing disputes and even if they believe that
ADR centers are a good idea, at least for now, they have chosen to decline
using it.
VII. CONCLUSION

Almost two decades after the implementation of judicial reform agendas
throughout Latin America, scholars and reform advocates are still debating
why many reform policies have failed in the region, and why institutionalized

...See G6mez, supra note 156.
346

Id.

347 Id.
348 Id.
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ADR processes have been so timidly received by Latin American business
disputants, contrary to the proponents' initial prediction. 49
In order to understand the reasons for these phenomena, scholars have
increasingly proposed the need for empirical research, but not much has been
done in that respect.35 ° To a certain extent, this Article has attempted to fill
that gap.
The present study showed that business disputants in Venezuela have
access to a variety of alternatives for processing their legal conflicts. As
shown, these alternatives operate on different levels, ranging from the official
fora that typically host formal mechanisms (i.e., trial in courts) to the noninstitutionalized environments of informal processes (i.e., mediation outside
ADR centers).
Furthermore, this research has revealed that individual choices for dispute
processing are heavily influenced by the social environment, and not simply
influenced by the factors commonly portrayed in traditional scholarly
literature, which views disputes as "disembodied events separated from the
social world" and not as a cultural behavior. 5 1
Traditional scholarly approaches have focused on the functioning of official
institutions and the processes that take place within them, without taking into
account the larger social context.352 These paradigms have also described
societies and their legal systems in terms of an artificial dichotomy that labels
them as traditional or modern. 353 As none of these approaches have
acknowledged the importance of social interactions and the ways in which
individual behavior is affected by the social context, researchers have been
able to obtain only a partial view of how institutions and social processes
operate.354
Legal and judicial reform advocates, for example, have traditionally looked
at dispute resolution processes through the narrow lens of state-sponsored
institutions and the mechanisms that typically take place within them, therefore

Id.
Messick, supra note 54.
"' Merry, supranote 29, at 2063.
352 See supra Part Il.
353 Id.
311 Id. It could be argued, however, that the new legal pluralism paradigm constitutes an
exception because it not only looks at the social interactions, but also at the "unofficial forms of
ordering located in social networks or institutions." Merry, supra note 22, at 869, 873.
349
350
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reaffirming the centralistic approach that has characterized traditional legal
scholarship for many years.355 Most reform agendas have focused on
strengthening official institutions, and the processes that take place within
them, and have largely disregarded the dynamics that occur outside such
formal institutions.356
Socio-legal scholars have usually paid most of their attention to the dispute
resolution processes that take place within the courts, in spite of the fact that
the majority of business disputes are not channeled through these official
fora.3 57 Few conflicts are actually brought into the judicial process; only a
fraction of these reach the stage of formal decision or judgment, 358 and an even
smaller number of disputes are actually resolved. 359 As in many other legal
systems, the majority of business disputes are not brought into the Venezuelan
courts, as parties do not view the courts as their first option.360 Nonetheless,
as stated above, reform advocates seem to have an entirely different picture.
In the specific case of Venezuela, by being entrenched in such a courtcentered approach, reformers and ADR advocates overlooked important
procedural choices that business disputants often make preventing them from
achieving an accurate assessment.36 1 Also, reformers acted on the basis of
several assumptions that were far from being proven.362
This Article recognizes that the context in which disputants interact and the
social relationships that connect them with other social actors exert an
important influence on how they decide to process their legal disputes through
the various formal and informal mechanisms.
As this research demonstrated, the decision to use a particular mechanism
(formal vs. informal) or procedural approach (adjudicatory vs. conciliatory,
dyadic vs. triadic) depends on the social context, and not necessarily on the

...Galanter, supra note 20, at 20-21. However, more recently, we have witnessed a surge
of scholarly work related to the idea of private ordering, thus offering a more ample view about
which processes disputants use and why. Id.
356 HuGo EYZAGUIRRE, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (Feb. 1996), availableat http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/sgcDocl2-E.pdf.
...Galanter, supranote 20, at 20.
358Id. at 3.
...Here, "resolved" means that both parties reach any form of closure.
360 See G6mez, supranote 156.
361 Id.
362 See G6mez, supra note 56.
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intrinsic characteristics of each mechanism. Venezuelan lawyers, for example,
do not use judicial processes because of their intrinsic value as impartial
adjudicatory mechanisms, but rather because they occur in a forum where
disputants feel comfortable. By the same token, business disputants seem to
use ADR processes not because ofADR's ability to ensure distributive justice,
but instead, because it takes place in a familiar social context. In other words,
the choice of mechanisms follows from the perceived advantages of the forum
to those who actually use it.
Additionally, by going beyond the artificial dichotomy fashioned by
traditional scholars to describe societies and their legal systems, the social
networks' paradigm has allowed me to describe dispute processing choices in
an environment that combines many features that are typically seen in
technologically advanced, modem and affluent societies, and at the same time,
some of the characteristics that socio-legal scholars attribute to societies
considered to be indigenous or traditional.
Dispute processing among Venezuelan business actors takes place in a
context where interpersonal relations are paramount and social networks have
permeated private and public institutions. This characteristic has allowed
social networks to become stronger and to maintain a leading role in the
operation of the business sector. It has also strongly influenced the way in
which its members process their disputes.
As stated above, social networks are often used for processing disputes
outside state institutions. However, from time to time, people need the
intervention of courts or other state-sponsored agencies which, interestingly,
also rely on the intervention of social networks.
The two examples offered in this Article of procedures and procedural
choices embedded within the larger case study of the Venezuelan business
sector demonstrate how disputants' choices are heavily influenced by the
social context in which they interact.
In the first place, the research demonstrates how reliance on social
networks drives business parties in Venezuela to use the courts voluntarily in
spite of the conventional wisdom-among judicial reform advocates-that
disputants avoid using the judiciary at all costs. Second, the research
demonstrates how social networks are also relied upon for mediating and
arbitrating disputes that arise among businesspeople and paradoxically, how
this has discouraged potential use of the recently established ADR centers.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 36:291

Although this project focused on the Venezuelan business sector, it has
broader implications. The social networks paradigm has offered a way to
explore the ways in which individuals cope with interpersonal conflict within
social group settings, to understand the ways in which group norms are
effectively enforced in the absence of a centralized formal authority; but most
importantly, to explain the influence of the social context on individual choices
for dispute processing mechanisms and fora, in a way that goes beyond the
dichotomy that views societies as either traditional or modern. 363 Ultimately,
this analysis also helps scholars understand the role of conflict in the
transformation and maintenance of social structures.
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